In the 1992 case of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,¹ the U.S. Supreme Court held that "when the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking."² A decade later, in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v.

The developed world has spent some $ 10 billion in assistance over the past 25 years to improve environmental policies and management in developing countries and countries in transition. The apparent assumption has been that it is sufficient to bring environmental professionals together and let them work on issues of mutual concern. Thus, western economists work with local economists to develop market-incentive instruments; engineers install technology; lawyers in concert with their counterparts draft laws or develop enforcement policies; and so forth.

This Article offers a global assessment of the record and promise of international environmental law to the beginning of the millennium. I first present several overall accounts of the contribution of international environmental law. Herein I describe the complexities of undertaking global evaluations. After summarizing the negative and positive evaluations, the Article takes a closer look at five case studies. I then lay out a description of a set of characteristics linked to effective law.

Federal law divides the responsibility of enforcing federal environmental regulations between federal agencies, typically the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and state agencies.¹ Generally, state programs receive formal approval or authorization from EPA to administer the federal environmental program.² EPA usually combines the delegation of authority to the states with retained enforcement authority for themselves.³

To those who have wearied of an environmental regulatory system that manages to combine sluggish bureaucracy with partisan rancor—and the list of the disenchanted appears to include just about everybody involved in the environmental field—contracts may seem to provide an attractive alternative. Because contracts are flexible, collaborative, and enforceable, they offer an opportunity to bypass litigation while addressing the failures of command-and-control regulation. Why, then, are they so little used?

There are many aspects of the Enron saga that would give pause to someone who thinks about the environment and its problems. One of the most obvious is the concern that allowing unregulated trading of energy might not account for the costs of environmental externalities that are concurrent with energy production and usage.¹ Another worry is that reducing the cost of energy may increase consumption and accelerate environmental degradation.

People's right to know about and participate in decisions that could affect their quality of life is increasingly recognized as a critical element of sustainable development.¹ In this context, the environmental matters have been a "wedge issue," allowing advocates to open up government processes and make them more accountable.² Natural resources and the environment play a fundamental role in ensuring a safe, healthy, and productive life, thus people are more likely to demand opportunities to be involved in decisions that affect these natur

The debate between free traders and environmentalists has increasingly been drawing global attention throughout the last decade. It centers, generally speaking, around the question of how best to resolve the often conflicting goals of international trade liberalization on the one hand, and an increasing need for global environmental protection on the other. Measures to protect the environment often affect trade between different states, while at the same time trade measures might affect environmental conditions.

Modern federal environmental law has a built-in dynamic of tension that since its inception has led to challenging relations between the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the states. On the one hand, the U.S. Congress enacted numerous environmental statutes in the early 1970s because of widespread dissatisfaction with state efforts to protect the environment. Congress made EPA ultimately accountable for achieving the mandates of federal law.

In May 2002, biologists made a surprising discovery—snakehead fish had proliferated in a small pond in Crofton, Maryland.¹ Snakeheads are a native fish of China and Korea, capable of tolerating extreme environmental conditions.² They are also fierce predators with the ability to disrupt native ecosystems through predation and competition.³ Immediately, concern arose over the presence of the snakeheads in Maryland due to their non-native status and highly invasive tendencies.