Editors' Summary: During congressional debate on CERCLA reauthorization, attention has focused on the role of states in executing the Act. Some observers of these debates have questioned the constitutionality of delegating EPA cleanup and enforcement authorities to states. In contrast, this Article argues that such delegation is permissible under the U.S. Constitution and constitutional jurisprudence. The author asserts that under the Appointments Clause, the delegation of CERCLA authorities to states would not usurp Executive Branch functions.

The federal courts are in agreement that an action by a potentially responsible party (PRP) against another PRP to recover privately incurred response costs is a claim for contribution in which the plaintiff is limited to the relief that is available under §113(f)(1) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).

Throughout recorded time, many have attempted to rewrite history to soften the harsh realities of the "good old days." Without question, hindsight remains 20/20 in reflecting upon how this country's modern, industrialized enterprises have adversely impacted the environment, including natural resources. The dilemma now facing businesses relates to natural resource damage liabilities resulting from past industrial progress and prosperity. Through the years, these businesses have paid for past wrongs through the remediation of contaminated media. Clearly, U.S.

On July 1, 2001, Colorado Senate Bill 01-145 (SB 145) took effect. The statute creates an "environmental covenant" as a mechanism for enforcing use restrictions imposed in connection with the remediation of contaminated sites. The environmental covenants contain use restrictions that were relied upon in the remedial decision. Such restrictions are commonly known as "institutional controls." Colorado enacted this law because it was not clear whether existing mechanisms (such as common-law covenants and easements) would be legally enforceable in relevant circumstances.

The Comprehensive Emergency Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) authorizes designated trustees to recover damages for injury to natural resources caused by a hazardous substance release. Under its delegated authority, the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) has promulgated regulations governing the assessment of natural resource damages (NRDs). The regulatory scheme, however, has posed tremendous difficulties for all interested parties.

Debate over reforms to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) consumed substantial energy during the 1997 session of Congress, and those deliberations will continue in 1998 with the hope of finally producing consensus about how the law can be improved. While interested parties may have different, often opposing views of how CERCLA should be reformed, some of their proposals may not represent progress, particularly the procedural changes related to restoring injured natural resources and expediting recoveries of natural resource damages (NRD).

The regulatory takings jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court has become an ungainly body, awkward for citizens and judges to apply and challenging as well, one might guess, for the Court itself, as it continues to reshape the law to better serve its aims. One cause of this predicament: leading decisions have arisen from peculiar facts and messy procedural contexts, yielding rulings that are hard to apply elsewhere. Another cause: the divergent views of Court members on the deference properly due the work of land use regulators.

To the extent the city argues that, as a matter of law, its landuse decisions are immune from judicial scrutiny under all circumstances, its position is contrary to settled regulatory takings principles. We reject this claim of error.

Improperly planned urban development has resulted in catastrophic sprawl. The present land use zeitgeist hails urban and suburban mixed-use zoning as the solution. Mixed-use zoning combines—rather than segregates—residential, commercial, and sometimes industrial land uses, and thereby decreases housing costs, decreases commuting periods, decreases vehicle miles traveled and air emissions, increases the efficient use of land and time, and increases consumer convenience.

Smart Growth admits of no clear definition. It provides a popular label for a growth strategy that addresses current concerns about traffic congestion, disappearing open space, nonpoint source pollution, the high cost of housing, increasing local property taxes, longer commutes, and the diminishing quality of community life. To accomplish smart growth, government must take two related actions. The first is the designation of discrete geographical areas into which private market growth pressures are directed.