Is an intentional temporary deprivation of the use of land not a "temporary taking"? This proposition was asserted by a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. The Ninth Circuit denied en banc review, despite a strong dissent by Judge Alex Kozinski. Perhaps because it had never explicated the meaning of "temporary taking," and perhaps in part because its interest was kindled by the Kozinski dissent, the U.S. Supreme Court recently granted certiorari. The question is limited to:

Editors' Summary: An information-sharing arrangement with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency gives teeth to the Securities and Exchange Commission's warning that companies that do not satisfy environmental disclosure requirements will be subject to enforcement actions. This Article provides companies a framework from which they can develop a strategy to meet those requirements. After briefly reviewing the relevant law, regulations, and guidance in this area, the authors offer insight into crafting and executing an effective environmental disclosure strategy.

The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR or the Bureau) observed its centennial in 2002, and celebrated 100 years of building dams and supplying water for irrigation and other purposes in the western United States. In 2003, the U.S. Department of the Interior (the Interior) and the Bureau shifted their focus to the future of the West and its water supply needs, producing a document called Water 2025: Preventing Crises and Conflict in the West.

In New York v. SCA Services, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York rejected the notion that a transporter cannot be an arranger under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). This Dialogue reviews the parties' arguments and the court's opinion. It then analyzes the impact this case will have on transporters.

Editors' Summary: Since 1910, the federal government has played a role in regulating pesticides. At first, the motive was to fight fraud, but as pesticides became more sophisticated and as environmental concerns grew, the government's regulatory efforts became more comprehensive. Now, near the dawn of bioengineered pesticides, with society confronting and reevaluating environmental risks, and with agencies facing fiscal challenges, pesticide regulation continues to evolve. It is a field of concern to the pesticide industry, of course, but in U.S.

There seems to be agreement across a wide spectrum of those involved in Superfund cleanups that such cleanups should take into consideration the kinds of activities that are expected to take place at the site after the remedial work is completed. While cleaning every site to levels suitable for all conceivable uses may be a laudable goal, doing so can impose costs that are out of proportion to the added amount of protection obtained.

Editors' Summary: Under CERCLA, a liable party cannot transfer its liability, yet it can contractually arrange for a third party to ultimately bear the financial burden of that liability. The applicability of these contractual allocations of environmental liability generally hinges on judicial interpretation of representations, warranties, indemnities, and releases. This Article surveys the case law on contractual allocation of CERCLA liability. Addressing legal issues unique to particular types of contractual provisions, the Article recommends ways to use and draft such provisions.

Editors' Summary: Despite adding the §113(f) "contribution" provision to CERCLA in 1986, Congress did not indicate whether the section was meant to supplement private parties' efforts to recover response costs form other potentially responsib parties's efforts to recover response costs form other potentially responsible parties under CERCLA §107 or was meant to preclude such cost recovery actions. More and more courts that address this issue are requiring plaintiffs to file §113(f) actions.

Editors' Summary: Institutional controls are a mechanism for providing a certain degree of safety in the absence of technology that could clean contaminated sites thoroughly. Institutional controls come in a variety of forms, each of which can be designed to meet specific site needs. Flexible but long-lasting mechanisms such as institutional controls can be used to ensure that land uses continue to be compatible with the level of cleanup at a site.

Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) in 1976, to regulate management of solid and hazardous waste. RCRA Subtitle C regulates hazardous waste management and Subtitle D governs nonhazardous, solid waste. In 1984, Congress passed the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA), significantly amending and expanding RCRA Subtitle C. HSWA added to RCRA the Land Disposal Restriction (LDR) Program, or land ban, which bars land disposal of hazardous wastes that fail to meet U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA or the Agency)-promulgated treatment standards.