In Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Supreme Court narrowly upheld orders issued by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) pursuant to §§113(a)(5) and 167 of the Clean Air Act (CAA or Act), prohibiting construction of a new power generator unit at a mine in Northwest Alaska.

Editors' Summary

The timing of environmental analysis and judicial review presents critical issues of interpretation under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Courts must be able to review an agency's compliance with NEPA before the agency makes major decisions, and before it invests significant resources that can compromise environmental review. Agencies must not be allowed to delay environmental review just because necessary data and research are difficult to obtain, or environmental impacts are uncertain. This Article discusses how the courts have handled these timing problems.

A recent headline on the front page of the Wall Street Journal hailed the opening of the nation's first "butterfly bank." The "deposits" in this unusual bank are conservation credits earned by preserving an important area of habitat for the Quino checkerspot butterfly, an endangered species restricted to California. The bank's intended customers are other landowners who hope to develop other sites where the butterfly occurs. In order to do so, they can buy credits from the private entrepreneur who established the butterfly bank.

The 1999 National Nuclear Security Administration Act (NNSA Act) threatens to reverse 20 years of reforms and court decisions intended to bring the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) into compliance with environmental laws and regulations. The NNSA Act, enacted in the wake of allegations of spying at Los Alamos nuclear weapons laboratory in New Mexico, established a semi-autonomous agency within DOE—the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The NNSA operates nine laboratories and facilities within the U.S. nuclear weapons complex.

Editors' Summary: Although the Clean Air Act is the primary tool used for controlling air toxics, the dramatic increase in toxic tort cases brought under common-law theories such as nuisance, trespass, negligence, and strict liability for ultrahazardous activities has raised concern in the industrial community that compliance with regulatory requirements may not protect industry from large-scale toxic tort liability. This Article analyzes the implications of common-law liability on the selection of air quality controls.

In the span of just a few years, the U.S. Supreme Court has brought the venerable constitutional concept of federalism back to life with a vengeance. In the 1999 Term alone, the Rehnquist Court struck down three federal laws for violating basic principles of federalism and narrowly construed a fourth to avoid any conflict with those precepts.

Editors' Summary: This past summer, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered its decision in Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 118 S. Ct. 1665, 28 ELR 21119 (1998). The Court held that an environmental group's challenge to a U.S. Forest Service land and resource management plan for the Wayne National Forest in Ohio was not ripe for review. This Article examines how this decision affects the rules for judicial review of national forest plans.

Since the enactment of Superfund in 1980, critics of the statute's liability regime have been relentless in their attempts to convince courts that Superfund liability is so unfair as to be unconstitutional. While their persistence has produced only minor changes in the liability regime, their cause may have been given a lift by the U.S. Supreme Court's 1998 decision in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel.

Despite the recent furor over the environmental damage threatened by the Republican-dominated 104th Congress, the so-called salvage logging bill—a rider on a budget-rescissions bill—so far is one of the few changes to environmental protection programs actually signed into law. One should not assume, however, that the logging rider's ability to survive a presidential veto means that it is an innocuous compromise.