In Defense of the Superfund Liability System: Matching the Diagnosis and the Cure
The Sad State of the Policy Debate
The Sad State of the Policy Debate
Since its creation in 1980, the Superfund program has overcome a number of obstacles. It survived embarrassing political scandals in its first few years. It endured a failure to reauthorize the underlying statute in 1985, a lapse that led to widespread disruptions at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and set the program back significantly. It has persevered in the face of attacks from many sides.
By the beginning of the 106th Congress, comprehensive legislative reform of the Superfund statute had consumed six fruitless years of effort. Adopting a new approach, the Administration decided to seek narrow, targeted legislation. In testimony that would be repeated several times in 1999, the U.S.
The 1990s mark the end of an era when pitched legislative battles can lead to either sound or timely public policy. Rather, the formulation of consensus by a critical mass of private-sector stakeholders is the only way to achieve the timely reauthorization of Superfund and may be the best (if not the only) way to break the gridlock that paralyzes other legislative debates.
New rules are emerging to change the way the government makes decisions about cleanup of hazardous waste sites under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund). These changes have altered Superfund decisionmaking fundamentally and irrevocably, requiring the government to reach for new levels of accountability, rationality, and consistency. Central to the government's ability to meet this challenge is the way in which it makes and explains decisions about acceptable risks and required levels of cleanup.
When the 103d Congress convened on January 5, 1993, many observers believed that it would make up for the dismal environmental record of its predecessor. The 102d Congress had tried and failed to reauthorize the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). Its attempt to elevate the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to a cabinet-level department had been blocked in the House of Representatives, and its attempt to reform the General Mining Law of 1872 had been blocked in both houses.
Editors' Summary: Until recently, the regulation of chemical carcinogens and the regulation of radiological carcinogens developed independently. Different governmental agencies operating under different statutory directives were responsible for addressing the dangers from these carcinogens. As a result, different policies and practices were developed. This Article explores these differences and the record on resolving them. It first examines the history of federal regulation of chemical and radiological carcinogens and summarizes EPA's approach to risk assessments for them.
In New York v. SCA Services, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York rejected the notion that a transporter cannot be an arranger under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). This Dialogue reviews the parties' arguments and the court's opinion. It then analyzes the impact this case will have on transporters.
Under the Superfund program, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA or the Agency) faces a dilemma. The Agency wants potentially responsible parties (PRPs) to perform voluntary response actions pursuant to administrative consent orders or judicial consent decrees (collectively referred to as "orders" unless otherwise specified), but does not want to commit extensive attorney resources to negotiating the details of every order.
There seems to be agreement across a wide spectrum of those involved in Superfund cleanups that such cleanups should take into consideration the kinds of activities that are expected to take place at the site after the remedial work is completed. While cleaning every site to levels suitable for all conceivable uses may be a laudable goal, doing so can impose costs that are out of proportion to the added amount of protection obtained.