In a recent article reviewing the U.S. Supreme Court's environmental decisions over the last 30 years (1969-1999), Professor Richard Lazarus argues that "the Justices have never fully appreciated environmental law as a distinct area of law."¹

The 1999 National Nuclear Security Administration Act (NNSA Act) threatens to reverse 20 years of reforms and court decisions intended to bring the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) into compliance with environmental laws and regulations. The NNSA Act, enacted in the wake of allegations of spying at Los Alamos nuclear weapons laboratory in New Mexico, established a semi-autonomous agency within DOE—the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The NNSA operates nine laboratories and facilities within the U.S. nuclear weapons complex.

The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the Clean Water Act (CWA), and the Clean Air Act (CAA) represent federal regulatory regimes for protecting the environment. Although each statute initially places administrative responsibility in the hands of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), each encourages states, to varying degrees, to take primary responsibility for implementing the statutory regime.

In Environmental Federalism Part 1: The History of Overfiling Under RCRA, the CWA, and the CAA Prior to Harmon, Smithfield, and CLEAN, the history of judicial and administrative decisions relating to overfiling under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the Clean Water Act (CWA), and the Clean Air Act (CAA) was analyzed. The history showed that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), with limited exceptions, generally was understood to have overfiling authority under RCRA, the CWA, and the CAA. The limited exceptions focused on two situations.

On January 11, 2002, President George W. Bush signed the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act (Act), which includes numerous amendments to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). The new legislation is designed to relieve small businesses from the financial burden of CERCLA liability, promote brownfields redevelopment, define transactional due diligence standards, and encourage state primacy in enforcement matters. The Act to some degree codifies U.S.

Editors' Summary: In recent years, vindication of private-property rights has been the rallying cry of various citizen groups and politicians who believe that certain regulatory restrictions—especially environmental protection measures—have "gone too far" and that the Fifth Amendment is an insufficient safeguard of private-property rights.

On June 29, 2001, the last day of the October 2000 term, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider "whether the [Ninth Circuit] Court of Appeals properly determined that a temporary moratorium on land development does not constitute a taking of property requiring compensation under the Takings Clause of the [U.S.] Constitution?" The case, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, provides the Court with an opportunity to clarify its opinions in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.

Editors' Summary: With their often substantial assets, parent corporations make attractive targets for parties seeking to remedy environmental harm. However, by challenging a court's jurisdiction over the parent, the parent may force a change of forum or, ultimately, a dismissal of the claims. This Article examines the scope of a parent's liabilities for the actions of its subsidiaries and discusses the jurisdictional issues.

Editors' Summary: Defining the scope of parent corporation liability under CERCLA has been a source of disagreement between appellate courts for years. This Article examines this disagreement and how it led to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in United States v. Bestfoods. First, the Article examines the two contradictory lines of cases that spawned the disagreement. Courts using the remedial purpose doctrine have held parent corporations directly liable under CERCLA based on general involvement with the business and not due to specific involvement in the polluting activities.

Editors' Summary: This past summer, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered its decision in Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 118 S. Ct. 1665, 28 ELR 21119 (1998). The Court held that an environmental group's challenge to a U.S. Forest Service land and resource management plan for the Wayne National Forest in Ohio was not ripe for review. This Article examines how this decision affects the rules for judicial review of national forest plans.