The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the Clean Water Act (CWA), and the Clean Air Act (CAA) represent federal regulatory regimes for protecting the environment. Although each statute initially places administrative responsibility in the hands of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), each encourages states, to varying degrees, to take primary responsibility for implementing the statutory regime.

In Environmental Federalism Part 1: The History of Overfiling Under RCRA, the CWA, and the CAA Prior to Harmon, Smithfield, and CLEAN, the history of judicial and administrative decisions relating to overfiling under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the Clean Water Act (CWA), and the Clean Air Act (CAA) was analyzed. The history showed that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), with limited exceptions, generally was understood to have overfiling authority under RCRA, the CWA, and the CAA. The limited exceptions focused on two situations.

On January 11, 2002, President George W. Bush signed the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act (Act), which includes numerous amendments to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). The new legislation is designed to relieve small businesses from the financial burden of CERCLA liability, promote brownfields redevelopment, define transactional due diligence standards, and encourage state primacy in enforcement matters. The Act to some degree codifies U.S.

Editors' Summary: With their often substantial assets, parent corporations make attractive targets for parties seeking to remedy environmental harm. However, by challenging a court's jurisdiction over the parent, the parent may force a change of forum or, ultimately, a dismissal of the claims. This Article examines the scope of a parent's liabilities for the actions of its subsidiaries and discusses the jurisdictional issues.

Editors' Summary: Defining the scope of parent corporation liability under CERCLA has been a source of disagreement between appellate courts for years. This Article examines this disagreement and how it led to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in United States v. Bestfoods. First, the Article examines the two contradictory lines of cases that spawned the disagreement. Courts using the remedial purpose doctrine have held parent corporations directly liable under CERCLA based on general involvement with the business and not due to specific involvement in the polluting activities.

One of the more daunting tasks facing environmental practitioners over the past decade or two has been the recovery of cleanup costs and related relief at sites contaminated with petroleum substances. Parties seeking relief face significant hurdles under the federal environmental statutes. The key federal environmental cost-recovery statute, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) often provides little help because of its petroleum exclusion.

Buried deep within the several thousand page Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act signed by President Clinton in the waning days of the 104th Congress are the first significant amendments in a decade to the much-debated Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund). CERCLA is the federal law that creates a broad class of parties potentially liable for expenses incurred in cleaning up sites contaminated with hazardous substances.

Congress will be returning to Washington about the time this Dialogue is published. The Superfund reauthorization bill that did not pass in the last Congress is the natural starting point for the renewed discussion in this Congress of Superfund's reauthorization. This Dialogue is about that upcoming reauthorization and has two purposes.

Editors' Summary: During congressional debate on CERCLA reauthorization, attention has focused on the role of states in executing the Act. Some observers of these debates have questioned the constitutionality of delegating EPA cleanup and enforcement authorities to states. In contrast, this Article argues that such delegation is permissible under the U.S. Constitution and constitutional jurisprudence. The author asserts that under the Appointments Clause, the delegation of CERCLA authorities to states would not usurp Executive Branch functions.

Editors' Summary: The enactment of CERCLA in 1980 sparked an explosion of contentious litigation between EPA and potentially responsible parties (PRPs) concerning the liability of PRPs under the Act. After over a decade of litigation in which EPA usually emerged victorious, the focus of CERCLA litigation has shifted to secondary suits between PRPs for cost recoupment, contribution, and insurance coverage, and, consequently, new issues have arisen. This Article examines the issues that dominate the emerging case law for secondary CERCLA suits.