Major emitting facilities are required to comply with BACT standards for each pollutant subject to regulation under the CAA. This requirement—initially thought to be inconsequential—has now become a dominant feature of the PSD program, for the first time subjecting greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources to federally mandated pollution control standards. This Article is the fifth in a series on the CAA’s complex PSD program.

The use of environmental tort claims to compensate pollution victims or to protect the environment and human health is still in an early stage of development in China. Nevertheless, tort cases play an outsized role in China’s environmental law system. From 2004 to 2009, China’s courts heard more environmental pollutionrelated tort cases than pollution-related administrative and criminal cases combined. Since 1998, the number of environmental lawsuits filed with the courts increased at an annual average of 25%.

This Comment presents an overview of China’s environmental administrative enforcement primarily regarding pollution control. It introduces the institutional framework of China’s environmental enforcement at the national and local levels and discusses the role of citizens and courts. The main challenges with China’s environmental enforcement are also presented.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded in 1949 by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). For almost three decades after the PRC’s establishment, there was a perception that a formal legal system for many areas of national life was unnecessary since the economy was centrally controlled and conflicts could thus be resolved through mediation or administrative means without reference to legal rights and obligations.

This Article proposes an “environmental practices money security interest” (EPMSI) that lawmakers could add to Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Article 9.1 The EPMSI would grant priority over earlier investors to financers whose extensions of credit enable debtors to invest in improving environmental impact.

Professor Wagner presents a strong and provocative set of arguments on how information overload is creating barriers to public participation, obfuscating the most important information for decisionmaking, and capturing and clogging the administrative rulemaking process. The forest can, indeed, become obscured by the trees when it comes to effective, efficient, and fair administrative agency decisionmaking.

There are no provisions in administrative law for regulating the flow of information entering or leaving the system, or for ensuring that regulatory participants can keep up with a rising tide of issues, details, and technicalities. Indeed, a number of doctrinal refinements, originally intended to ensure that executive branch decisions are made in the sunlight, inadvertently create incentives for participants to overwhelm the administrative system with complex information, causing many of the decisionmaking processes to remain, for all practical purposes, in the dark.

We wish to begin with a note of thanks to Richard Morgenstern, Jeffrey Hopkins, Laurie Johnson, Daniel Lashof, and Kristen Sheeran for their comments on our article, Climate Change and U.S. Interests. The comments have helped our own thinking on the subject, and it is gratifying to know that our paper stimulated such thoughtful responses. In the few pages we have for our reply, we focus on the claims that are most important and in the greatest tension with our article.

Jody Freeman’s and Andrew Guzman’s article, Climate Change and U.S. Interests, was engaging and convincing in many aspects, though I am not sure that the parts that engaged and convinced me were the parts that Freeman and Guzman intended. While I find their introductory premise flawed, these flaws are not fatal. Still, the material that follows must necessarily be updated and enhanced.

Developing a rational, globally efficient time path for pricing or controlling greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions presents daunting challenges to policy makers, with large scientific uncertainties, and the absence of consensus over the long term goals of climate policies. In their article Climate Change and U.S.