The court holds that the standard for admissibility of novel scientific evidence set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), and State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980), rather than the standard set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 23 ELR ...
The court holds that a Native American tribe in California cannot regulate land use of fee-patented private property within its reservation boundary. A nonmember of the tribe that owned her land in fee sought to harvest timber. After receiving a state logging permit, the property owner sent a check ...
The court affirms in part and reverses in part a mining union's claim that the state of Utah breached a trust created for the establishment of a hospital for disabled miners by using the trust to construct a rehabilitation center for the general public. The court first holds that the Utah Enabling A...
The court holds that a gambling machine, known as the Lucky Tab II, used on Native American lands should be classified under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) as a Class II aid, the use of which does not require a Native American tribe to first obtain state approval in a tribal-state compact. ...
The court holds that an insurance company is liable for neither indemnification nor defense costs incurred by a housing authority in a suit brought by a mother whose child suffered injuries from lead paint on the walls of the authority's housing complex. The court holds that the pollution exclusion ...
Editors' Summary: In its 20-year history, the congressionally established wilderness system has seldom seen as much controversy as it has of late. Development pressures are increasing, the controlling agencies are reconsidering their wilderness policies, and Congress is being pressed to make ultimate decisions about the status of undeveloped lands.
October 3, 1983, began another Supreme Court Term, the third since the retirement of Justice Stewart and the addition of Justice O'Connor. This Court has heard few major environmental cases. It has usually denied certiorari in cases requiring interpretation of the complex pollution control statutes, accepting cases primarily where there is a split among the circuits, as in the currently pending case of United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co.1 When the Court breaks this pattern, as it has with the D.C. Circuit's decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Editors' Summary: Section 304 of the Clean Air Act enacted in 1970 was the first provision expressly empowering citizens to act as private attorneys general to enforce a federal statute. Every federal environmental statute enacted since 1970, except FIFRA, has included a citizen suit provision, and each provision has been modeled on §304. In Part I of this three-part series, Mr. Miller discusses the origin and legislative history of citizen suits and explains the similarities and differences among the various provisions. He describes who may and may not bring suit and who may be sued.
Editors' Summary: It has been almost three years since the enactment of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund) and the prospects for rapid achievement of the Act's goals are not bright. Implementation of CERCLA has been plagued by lack of information on the scope and incomplete scientific understanding of the mechanisms of hazardous waste pollution.
Editors' Summary: The biotechnology revolution has arrived, bringing the promise of great benefits in medicine, agriculture, and pollution control, but also the potential for serious harm from deliberate releases of new organisms into the environment. Already, federal agencies are assessing the need for regulation. The regulators must grapple with questions about the nature and magnitude of the risks of biotechnology, and about whether existing statutes or comprehensive genetic engineering control law is the best way to protect the environment from the new technologies.