The chub is a fish that many Americans have never heard of. To many others, however, it is a food; to the fishermen of Lake Michigan, a livelihood; and to the Vita Food Company, purveyors of smoked chub, a business. In the past few years, the level of DDT and dieldrin in Lake Michigan has risen, and so too have residues of the two chemicals in the tissues of the fish caught in the lake's waters.

Mass-marketed recreational "off-road vehicles" (ORVs) such as snowmobiles, dune buggies, trail bikes, motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles, and four-wheel drive cars and light trucks are a comparatively recent phenomenon. These descendants of the World War II "jeep" are designed for overland use in addition to travel on paved roads and highways.

Recent ELR Comments have discussed the gradual erosion in the past few years of the "American rule" barring awards of counsel fees to successful litigants.¹ The appearance of public interest legal organizations has accelerated that trend, as the relief sought is usually injunctive, and injunctions do not pay the rent. Beginning with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress has included provisions authorizing grants of counsel fees in several pieces of legislation that depend on citizens' initiative for their implementation and enforcement.

In a sweeping move that has raised some doubts among mayors, city attorneys and environmentalists, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) secured congressional enactment in August of a new authority to shift the burden of assessing environmental impacts of HUD-supported projects to local agencies that apply for HUD funds. The operative provision, §104(h) of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974,¹ states:

The extent of the federal government's duty to comply with state pollution control requirements under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 remains a problematic area of environmental law.

Editors' Summary: The contamination of sediments in aquatic environments poses a direct threat to water quality, bottom-dwelling organisms, and animals feeding on those organisms. In recognition of the pervasive nature of this problem, several state and federal agencies are attempting to fashion guidelines for identifying, regulating, and cleaning up polluted sediments. This Article summarizes those efforts in light of the key regulatory and scientific dilemmas faced by agencies attempting to manage such sediments.

Editors' Summary: EPA's rules for determining what substances must be regulated as hazardous waste under RCRA are, to put it mildly, complicated. Understanding these rules, however, is vital, since hazardous wastes are subject to much more complex and costly requirements than nonhazardous solid wastes. Two of EPA's most important rules for determining whether a material will be classified as a hazardous waste are the "mixture" and "derived-from" rules.

Editors' Summary: The U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, raises the threshold requirements that an environmental plaintiff must meet to establish its standing to sue. Although the decision will not fundamentally alter who brings environmental issues before the courts, the decision may herald an era in which pleading formalism and proof of each standing element are required. Proof offered to support standing will have to satisfy the Court's interpretation in Defenders of the standing requirements.

Editors' Summary: Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (Defenders), the Supreme Court's June 1992, decision limiting environmentalists' standing to challenge agency programs, envisions judges' roles in environmental law strikingly different than the roles judges have often played before. Justice Scalia's plurality opinion articulates a limited role for the judiciary, anchored in the belief that government's programmatic decisions and rules of general application are normally inappropriate for judicial review.

Editors' Summary: CERCLA § 107(e) recognizes that private parties may agree to limit or to insure against their CERCLA liability by using common law contract tools, including indemnification and hold harmless agreements. But what role did Congress intend such private party agreements to play in allocating CERCLA liability? The plainly contradictory language of CERCLA § 107(e) does not give a final answer to this question, because the first sentence of CERCLA § 107(e) appears to invalidate indemnities and the like, and the second sentence appears to save them.