On June 28, 2024, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, concluding that courts have a constitutional and statutory obligation to exercise their “independent judgment” when deciding whether a federal administrative agency has acted within its statutory authority. As Justice Neil Gorsuch noted in concurrence, the Court’s decision “places a tombstone on Chevron no one can miss.” This Comment discusses the Court’s decision and its implications for legal challenges to federal agency actions. 

The Joseph Biden Administration has signaled an interest in ensuring that regulations appropriately benefit vulnerable and disadvantaged communities. Prior presidential administrations have focused on ensuring that regulations are efficient, maximizing the net benefits to society, without considering who benefits or who loses from these policies. Supporters of the current process are concerned that pursuing equity will come at significant cost to efficiency and ultimately leave everyone worse off. This framework—efficiency versus equity—is misguided and counterproductive in many cases.

This Comment touches on some of the key concerns that Dave Owen's The Negotiable Implementation of Environmental Law raised about equity and transparency in environmental law, and shares a couple of examples that have emerged in the last few months that people are inventing to try to address this.

Black letter law is implemented in countless shades of gray, with interpretation and negotiation at virtually every step of the way. Prof. Dave Owen’s The Negotiable Implementation of Environmental Law digs deep, beyond the obvious, to underscore that negotiation is not a dark art but a necessary skill that deserves more attention and training.

Dave Owen's The Negotiable Implementation of Environmental Law did a nice job of highlighting some of the major statutes that are the backbone of our practice and the launching point for effective negotiation. One of the implications of the article that highlights the axiom “wake up . . . people are negotiating” is to understand that promulgation of the law by regulations is not the end point.

In theoretical accounts of environmental law, traditional environmental-law education, and much of the discourse of environmental-law implementation, negotiation is absent, except in a few celebrated and seemingly exceptional settings. When scholars and policy advocates do address the roles of negotiation, they tend to default to two competing conceptions. In one—the “command-and-control” view—environmental law is problematically centralized and rigid, and negotiation exists only in exceptional circumstances.

Choice architecture as defined by Professor Mormann in Climate Choice Architecture is helpful and important, but it is also easy to overestimate its impact. It is not everything. This Comment argues that choice architecture is framing a decision at the point of decisionmaking, presenting a list in a specific way, like the decoy effect, setting defaults. Sometimes, social norms and feedback is choice architecture if presented at the time of making a decision or if presented at the optimal choice opportunity.

Prof. Felix Mormann’s Climate Choice Architecture provides a comprehensive framework and a masterful summary of the state of knowledge on behavioral nudges as they are applied to environmental outcomes. It does a great job of summarizing the literature and also crosses over from energy into water as well. This Comment supports Professor Mormann's conclusion that nudges can be very powerful instruments for achieving climate goals.