On January 17, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce.

Recent U.S. presidential administrations have been the apex of what scholars have identified as “the rise of executive-level power, the use of the ‘administrative presidency,’ and the growing democratic deficit.” Indeed, with legislative gridlock in the U.S. Congress that seems to have no end in sight, the use of agencies in the executive branch has been adopted by both political parties as the main vehicle of policymaking. This Comment acknowledges the ongoing regulatory uncertainty in the United States, categorizes it, and explores theoretical frameworks for presidential transitions.

When the 103d Congress convened on January 5, 1993, many observers believed that it would make up for the dismal environmental record of its predecessor. The 102d Congress had tried and failed to reauthorize the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). Its attempt to elevate the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to a cabinet-level department had been blocked in the House of Representatives, and its attempt to reform the General Mining Law of 1872 had been blocked in both houses.