The D.C. Circuit dismissed for mootness a nonprofit group's petition to review FERC's determination that a proposed liquefied natural gas facility in Port St. Joe, Florida, fell outside the Commission's jurisdiction under §3 of the Natural Gas Act. The group's members argued they would suffer economic, environmental, and aesthetic injuries if the facility were built. Before oral argument, however, FERC informed the court that the plans to build the facility had been abandoned. The court dismissed the petition as moot and vacated FERC's determination.

In an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit vacated a district court's judgment reinstating a 2016 moratorium on new coal leasing on public lands that was lifted by a DOI secretarial order in 2017. Environmental groups, several states, and a tribe argued BLM's final EA and FONSI violated NEPA. DOI subsequently issued a secretarial order in 2021 that revoked the 2017 order and directed agencies to submit a plan to reverse, amend, or update the policies created to implement it. BLM then argued the 2021 order rendered the controversy moot, but the district court found a live controversy persisted because the 2021 order did not resume the moratorium, and thus that the 2017 order remained in partial effect. It further found BLM failed to comply with NEPA because it limited the scope of its analysis to only four leases, and reinstated the moratorium pending a more complete NEPA review. The appellate court disagreed, finding the 2021 order definitively revoked the 2017 order such that it was legally nonexistent and could not be changed through further NEPA analysis. It vacated the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case as moot.

The Tenth Circuit, 2-1, affirmed in part and reversed in part summary judgment for an oil and gas company in a lawsuit brought by a cattle ranch in Oklahoma. The ranch brought several tort claims, arguing the company's pipeline leaked and contaminated its property. A district court concluded the contaminant levels found were too low to give rise to a nuisance or environmental harm, and granted summary judgment for the company. The appellate court found the ranch presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to legal injury and causation on its claims for private nuisance, public nuisance, and negligence per se, but not on its claims for constructive fraud and trespass. It remanded to the district court with directions to conduct a trial on the issues of private nuisance, public nuisance, and negligence per se.

A district court granted in part environmental groups' motion for summary judgment in a challenge to various agency actions relating to EPA's approval of the state of Florida's application to assume permitting authority under §404 of the CWA. The groups argued EPA and FWS violated the ESA because neither the programmatic biological opinion (BiOp) nor the programmatic incidental take statement (ITS) included species-specific analysis, effects analysis, numerical quantification of take, and related statutory and regulatory requirements. The agencies countered that even if the BiOp and ITS lacked these mandated elements, FWS and EPA permissibly deferred relevant considerations to an alternative "technical assistance process," under which Florida was required to consult with FWS regarding each permit application, FWS was provided the “opportunity” to specify take limits, and Florida was required to include those limits in its state-issued permits. The court found that FWS' BiOp and ITS failed to satisfy the requirements of the ESA, and was unpersuaded that the non-statutory technical assistance process was a lawful substitute for the procedures and remedies that Congress enacted in the ESA and that FWS and NMFS established in their implementing regulations. It granted summary judgment for the groups on their ESA claims, and vacated EPA's approval of Florida's assumption application.

A district court granted the state of Vermont's motion to remand to state court a climate misinformation suit brought against fossil fuel companies. The state initially sued in state court, arguing the companies violated the Vermont Consumer Protection Act by failing to inform consumers about the impacts of fossil fuel products on climate change. The companies removed the suit to federal court, and Vermont moved to remand. The court found the state's complaint did not assert any federal cause of action, but rather invoked Vermont's consumer protection law, and that there was no diversity of citizenship. It granted the motion to remand.

A district court denied a mining company's motion for partial summary judgment in a lawsuit concerning pollution from the company's British Columbia smelter along the Upper Columbia River. Tribal members sought natural resource damages for contamination of the river. The company argued the members' claims should be dismissed because they did not adhere to CERCLA regulations that allegedly require certain compliance by parties when evaluating natural resource damages assessments (NRDAs), the claims were premature, and potential costs to restore benthic habitat loss were too uncertain. The court found the company failed to identify a portion of CERCLA that required public participation, cost-effectiveness, or a “restoration alternatives analysis” in the NRDA procress, that the claims were ripe because they were brought within three years of discovery at sites where no remedial action was planned, and the company provided no case law demonstrating that the alleged uncertainty of members' damages calculations warranted summary judgment. It denied the company's motion.

A district court granted in part and denied in part a tribe's motion for partial summary judgment in a lawsuit concerning a hydroelectric dam on the Puyallup River in Washington. The tribe argued the dam operator's installation of a temporary rock dam/spillway unlawfully harmed and harassed Chinook salmon, steelhead trout, and bull trout by impeding upstream progress. The court found the structure was impeding fish passage and taking threatened species, and that the take was unlawful because the operator did not have an incidental take permit authorizing it. It ordered the operator to comply with the tribe's alternative removal plan, apply for necessary permits, and remove a significant portion of the rock dam/spillway.

The Fourth Circuit reversed a district court order abstaining from ruling on constitutional claims brought by mineral interest owners challenging amendments to West Virginia's oil and gas conservation law. Plaintiffs argued the amendments, which for the first time authorized "unitization of interests in horizontal well drilling units” as to nonconsenting owners, were a taking of their property and deprived them of property without due process, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The West Virginia Oil and Gas Conservation Commission moved to dismiss for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. The district court abstained from ruling on the constitutional claims, relying on the Pullman abstention doctrine. The appellate court found the district court failed to identify the unclear issue of state law relevant to its dismissal and failed to explain how state law implicated the resolution of plaintiffs' claims, neither of which were based on the West Virginia Constitution. It reversed the district court's order and remanded with instructions that the Commission's standing argument be addressed before any other issues.

A district court granted NMFS' motion to dismiss a challenge to its lobster fishing gear regulations. Environmental groups argued the regulations did not adequately protect the endangered North American right whale, in violation of the ESA and the Marine Mammal Protection Act. NMFS moved to dismiss for mootness, in light of Congress having since enacted legislation declaring the Service's regulations to be "sufficient" through 2028 and the D.C. Circuit having vacated the Service's most recent biological opinion (BiOp) as being too restrictive of fishing. The court agreed, finding the new legislation precluded granting the relief the groups sought and that vacatur of the BiOp left nothing from which to seek relief. It granted the motion to dismiss.

A district court denied nonprofit groups' motion for summary judgment in a challenge to FWS' 2016 decision to delist the Louisiana black bear after determining its population had recovered and was no longer threatened. The groups argued FWS should not have included the Upper Atchafalaya River Basin subpopulation in its analysis because the bears there are not truly native to Louisiana, that it should have considered the loss of historical range and population, that its threat analysis was arbitrary and capricious, and that its conclusion the bear was not threatened in a "significant portion of its range" was arbitrary and capricious. The court found FWS engaged in a reasoned analysis of the positive and negative effects of hybridization on the bear, properly considered historical range and population, performed a reasoned analysis of threats to the bear's habitat and adequacy of regulatory protections, and reasonably concluded that the bear was not threatened. It denied summary judgment for the groups, and granted FWS' cross-motion.