The Montana Supreme Court, 5-2, reversed a lower court order that revoked the Montana Department of Environmental Quality's (MDEQ's) approval of a permit for construction and operation of a proposed copper mine. Conservation groups argued MDEQ's issuance of the permit violated the state's Metal Mine Reclamation Act and Montana Environmental Quality Act. The district court concluded MDEQ did not rationally consider and ensure the safety and stability of the proposed tailings facility, failed to rationally evaluate the environmental impact of the nitrogen discharges, and failed to reasonably analyze alternatives. The appellate court disagreed, concluding MDEQ made a scientifically driven permitting decision that was supported by substantial evidence. It reversed the district court's order, and remanded to the court to reinstate MDEQ's decision to grant the permit.

The D.C. Circuit, 2-1, granted in part and denied in part petitions to review EPA's SIP call for 35 states and the District of Columbia. A group of about half these states as well as companies subject to those SIPs sued, arguing EPA misinterpreted its authority under the CAA when it called for SIPs containing at least one of four types of startup, shutdown, or malfunction (SSM) provisions that it deemed impermissible: (1) automatic exemptions; (2) director's discretion provisions; (3) overbroad enforcement discretion provisions; and (4) affirmative defense provisions. The court found EPA abided by its authority under CAA §7410(k)(5). As for EPA's decision to issue the call for the four types of SSM provisions, the court agreed with petitioners as to the automatic exemptions and director's discretion provisions and set aside the calls insofar as they rested on those; rejected petitioners' challenge to the overbroad enforcement discretion provisions and upheld EPA's final action; and agreed with petitioners as to certain types of affirmative defense provisions but rejected their challenge as to other types. It granted the petitions and vacated the SIP-call order with respect to the calls based on automatic exemptions, director’s discretion provisions, and affirmative defenses that are functionally exemptions, but denied them as to the calls based on the enforcement discretion provision and affirmative defenses against specific relief.

The D.C. Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part summary judgment for commercial fishermen in a challenge to an NMFS rule implementing an amendment to a fishery management plan for reef fish resources in the Gulf of Mexico. The fishermen argued the amendment arbitrarily relied on an economic analysis that NMFS had previously rejected, and that it lacked the catch limits and accountability measures required by the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act. A district court granted summary judgment for NMFS. The appellate court found NMFS failed to provide an explanation for its decision to use the net-economic-benefit analysis to compare alternatives that it had previously rejected when it adopted a prior amendment. It remanded without vacatur for NMFS to address whether the economic analysis underlying the amendment was sufficiently different from the analysis it previously used that has since been discredited.

The D.C. Circuit affirmed dismissal of a challenge to two FWS rules that delayed a 2021 proposed rule to reduce the amount of land in the Pacific Northwest designated as critical habitat for the northern spotted owl. A logging group challenged the validity of the rules delaying the effective date of the proposed rule, but after the rules expired, the district court determined the group's claims were moot and dismissed the suit. The appellate court agreed, finding the group had not shown how invalidating the expired rules would provide it with any "effectual relief," and that the "capable of repetition yet evading review" exception to mootness did not apply here. It affirmed dismissal.

In an en banc decision, the Ninth Circuit, 6-5, affirmed a district court order denying a tribal group's motion for preliminary injunction against the U.S. government's transfer of federal land within Tonto National Forest to a mining company. The land is a site of spiritual value to the Western Apache and also contains the world's third-largest deposit of copper ore. The tribe sued, seeking an injunction on the ground that the transfer would violate its members' rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and an 1852 treaty between the United States and the Apaches. The court found the group's claim under the Free Exercise Clause failed under Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988), because as in Lyng, the government’s actions with respect to “publicly owned land” would have no “tendency to coerce” tribal members “into acting contrary to their religious beliefs,” and the transfer did not discriminate against the members, penalize them, or deny them an “equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.” It further found the RFRA claim failed for the same reasons because what counted as “substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion” must be understood as subsuming, rather than abrogating, the holding of Lyng. The claims based on the 1852 treaty also failed because the government’s statutory obligation to transfer the land abrogated any contrary treaty obligation. The court affirmed the district court's order denying the motion for preliminary injunction.

A district court denied summary judgment for a trade group representing ranchers and beef producers in a challenge to FWS' denial of the group's petition to remove the southwestern willow flycatcher from the endangered list under the ESA. The group argued FWS' denial, which concluded the southwestern willow flycatcher was a valid subspecies, was arbitrary and capricious because the Service did not define "subspecies" or use the best available science. FWS argued that it considered the best available science, found that the flycatcher satisfied methods taxonomists use to identify subspecies, and explained its reasoning. The court agreed, finding the group had not shown FWS' determination that the flycatcher was an endangered species was arbitrary and capricious. It denied summary judgment for the group, granted FWS' cross-motion, and dismissed.

A district court granted NMFS' motion to dismiss a challenge to its decision to issue several incidental take authorizations (ITAs) for wind farm development off the coasts of New Jersey and New York. A nonprofit group argued NMFS violated the Marine Mammal Protection Act because the ITAs had more than a "negligible" impact on "small numbers of marine mammals" and violated NEPA by failing to submit a cumulative EIS ascertaining potential harm of all ITAs. NMFS moved to dismiss for lack of standing, ripeness, and mootness. The court found the group's allegations with respect to its interest in marine mammals failed to demonstrate imminent and concrete injury, that its claims against ITAs not yet issued were unripe, and that its claims against expired ITAs were moot. It dismissed the suit.

The Third Circuit granted petitions to review FERC orders allowing the administrator of a 2024/2025 capacity auction to apply a new rule retroactively to a pending action to avoid a spike in electricity prices. Electric suppliers and their trade groups argued the orders violated the filed rate doctrine, which forbids retroactive rates, and sought to have them vacated. The appellate court found the new rule was retroactive because it altered the legal consequence attached to a past auction when it allowed the administrator of the auction to use a different locational deliverable area reliability requirement than the one it had calculated and posted, and that FERC violated the filed rate doctrine by approving it. It granted the petitions and vacated the portion of FERC's orders allowing the new rule to be applied to the 2024/2025 capacity auction.