The court holds that a band of Native Americans has the right to moor commercial fishing vessels at two municipally owned marinas on Lake Michigan. The court first holds that treaties signed in 1836 and 1855 provided for an easement of access to reach traditional fishing grounds, which includes the ...
Editors' Summary: This Article addresses the effect of the U.S. Constitution's Takings Clause on the government's authority to protect environmental resources. An earlier Article, published in the May 1994 of ELR, analyzed bases for government regulation provided by limitations inherent in the property right itself. In contrast, this Article focuses on an emerging doctrine of sustainable use, rooted in background principles of nuisance law and the government's complementary police power.
Editors' Summary: Environmental regulation has come under increasing attack from those who argue that governmental limitations on property use violate constitutional restrictions on regulatory takings of property. The author addresses this controversy by focusing on the background limitations on owners' rights that are inherent in property law itself, as opposed to the external controls that government may impose under the doctrines of police power and nuisance.
Is an intentional temporary deprivation of the use of land not a "temporary taking"? This proposition was asserted by a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. The Ninth Circuit denied en banc review, despite a strong dissent by Judge Alex Kozinski. Perhaps because it had never explicated the meaning of "temporary taking," and perhaps in part because its interest was kindled by the Kozinski dissent, the U.S. Supreme Court recently granted certiorari. The question is limited to:
In New York v. SCA Services, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York rejected the notion that a transporter cannot be an arranger under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). This Dialogue reviews the parties' arguments and the court's opinion. It then analyzes the impact this case will have on transporters.
The court holds that potentially responsible parties (PRPs) compelled to initiate a hazardous waste site cleanup are precluded from joint and several cost recovery from other PRPs under Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) §107(a), and, thus, are limited to...
The court holds that the political question doctrine does not bar a federal court from resolving landowners' suits alleging that a state-managed fish pass significantly contributed to beach erosion on their property. The court first holds that the landowners' claims for injunctive relief and damages...
The court holds that when a party is liable for pollution response costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), it must share them regardless of whether it is the sole cause of the costs. An airplane manufacturer brought a contribution action agains...
The court reverses and remands a district court's allocation of insurance coverage costs between an insured and its excess insurers for soil, groundwater, and wetlands contamination at the insured's tank truck terminal. The court first holds that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction ov...
The court holds that under New York law, insurers are not obligated to defend and indernnify a clothing manufacturer from private and government damage claims stemming from contamination at the manufacturer's New York and Virgin Islands facilities. The manufacturer acquired the two facilities from s...