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Narrowing the Roads of Private Cost Recovery: Recent Developments Limiting the Recovery of Private Response Costs Under CERCLA §107

Editors' Summary: Despite adding the §113(f) "contribution" provision to CERCLA in 1986, Congress did not indicate whether the section was meant to supplement private parties' efforts to recover response costs form other potentially responsib parties's efforts to recover response costs form other potentially responsible parties under CERCLA §107 or was meant to preclude such cost recovery actions. More and more courts that address this issue are requiring plaintiffs to file §113(f) actions.

Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp.

The court holds that potentially responsible parties (PRPs) compelled to initiate a hazardous waste site cleanup are precluded from joint and several cost recovery from other PRPs under Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) §107(a), and, thus, are limited to...

Oman-Fischbach Int'l (JV) v. Pirie

The court affirms an Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals decision denying a construction company's application for an equitable adjustment for additional costs incurred hauling waste from its construction activities at a U.S. Navy project at the Lajes Air Base on Terceira Island in the Azores. ...

Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif

The court holds that a citizen group may maintain a private right-of-action against a state agency under discriminatory effect regulations promulgated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) pursuant to §602 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. The citizen group alleged that a state agenc...

Foundation for Horses & Other Animals v. Babbitt

The court holds that the National Park Service's decision to remove a herd of 12 horses from Santa Cruz Island in the Channel Islands did not violate the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The court first holds that the plaintiff foundation provided no support for its assertion that the horse...

Goshen Rd. Envtl. Action Team v. Department of Agric.

The court holds that a North Carolina town and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) did not violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act or the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in connection with the siting of a wastewater treatment facility in an African-American neighborhood. The court fi...

Gibbs v. Babbitt

The court holds that a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) regulation that prohibits private landowners in Tennessee and North Carolina from intentionally taking red wolves found on their property unless the wolf is attacking or has attacked a person, livestock, or pets, is a valid exercise of fede...

Colorado Farm Bureau Fed'n v. U.S. Forest Serv.

The court holds that farmer and cattlemen associations lack standing under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §551(13), to challenge the U.S. Forest Service's involvement with the Colorado lynx recovery plan, which concerns the introduction of Canadian lynx into the state. The court f...

Gibson v. Babbitt

The court holds that the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (BGEPA), which only allows members of federally recognized Native American tribes to use protected eagle parts for religious purposes, does not violate the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA). The court first recognizes that the ...

Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon: A Clarion Call for Property Rights Advocates

Editors' Summary: Property rights advocates implicitly complained in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon that a Fish and Wildlife Service regulation that aimed to protect endangered and threatened species by defining "harm" to include habitat modification impinged on their rights as private landowners by asking them to share with the government responsibility for protecting such species. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the regulation as reasonable given the relevant language of the Endangered Species Act.