"When the well is dry, we [will] learn the worth of water."

—Ben Franklin, a U.S. Founding Father

One of the more daunting tasks facing environmental practitioners over the past decade or two has been the recovery of cleanup costs and related relief at sites contaminated with petroleum substances. Parties seeking relief face significant hurdles under the federal environmental statutes. The key federal environmental cost-recovery statute, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) often provides little help because of its petroleum exclusion.

Since the enactment of Superfund in 1980, critics of the statute's liability regime have been relentless in their attempts to convince courts that Superfund liability is so unfair as to be unconstitutional. While their persistence has produced only minor changes in the liability regime, their cause may have been given a lift by the U.S. Supreme Court's 1998 decision in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel.

The federal courts are in agreement that an action by a potentially responsible party (PRP) against another PRP to recover privately incurred response costs is a claim for contribution in which the plaintiff is limited to the relief that is available under §113(f)(1) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).

Editors' Summary: Environmental professionals continue to consider the implications of the 2006 U.S. Supreme Court landmark decision regarding CWA jurisdiction, Rapanos v. United States. In this Article, Matthew A. Axtell uses Justice William O. Douglas'travel description of Alaska's Last Lake as a hypothetical to test the potential impact of the 2001 SWANCC decision as well as Rapanos on the federal government's CWA authority in Alaska. He begins by analyzing the CWA regulatory regime that applied for many years to Alaskan tundra wetlands before SWANCC and Rapanos.