On June 29, 2001, the last day of the October 2000 term, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider "whether the [Ninth Circuit] Court of Appeals properly determined that a temporary moratorium on land development does not constitute a taking of property requiring compensation under the Takings Clause of the [U.S.] Constitution?" The case, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, provides the Court with an opportunity to clarify its opinions in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.

Editors' Summary: With their often substantial assets, parent corporations make attractive targets for parties seeking to remedy environmental harm. However, by challenging a court's jurisdiction over the parent, the parent may force a change of forum or, ultimately, a dismissal of the claims. This Article examines the scope of a parent's liabilities for the actions of its subsidiaries and discusses the jurisdictional issues.

"When the well is dry, we [will] learn the worth of water."

—Ben Franklin, a U.S. Founding Father

One of the more daunting tasks facing environmental practitioners over the past decade or two has been the recovery of cleanup costs and related relief at sites contaminated with petroleum substances. Parties seeking relief face significant hurdles under the federal environmental statutes. The key federal environmental cost-recovery statute, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) often provides little help because of its petroleum exclusion.

Editors' Summary: Pfiesteria piscicida, a sometimes toxic microorganism, is responsible for the death of millions of fish in Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia. Although the problem of Pfiesteria-related fish kills is associated with the Mid-Atlantic region, other toxic microorganisms have threatened fish and marine wildlife throughout the world. Scientists attribute this "global epidemic" of toxic microbes to excessive nutrient loading from nonpoint sources of pollution.

Editors' Summary: During congressional debate on CERCLA reauthorization, attention has focused on the role of states in executing the Act. Some observers of these debates have questioned the constitutionality of delegating EPA cleanup and enforcement authorities to states. In contrast, this Article argues that such delegation is permissible under the U.S. Constitution and constitutional jurisprudence. The author asserts that under the Appointments Clause, the delegation of CERCLA authorities to states would not usurp Executive Branch functions.

The federal courts are in agreement that an action by a potentially responsible party (PRP) against another PRP to recover privately incurred response costs is a claim for contribution in which the plaintiff is limited to the relief that is available under §113(f)(1) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).

Editor's Summary: The exact contours of wetlands jurisdiction has been in dispute ever since the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Today, the Court has been given the chance to clarify this area of law as it faces two cases dealing with wetlands jurisdiction. In Rapanos v. United States, the Court must decide whether CWA jurisdiction extends to a series of wetlands that do not abut a navigable-in-fact water. And in Carabell v. U.S.

Editors' Summary: Environmental professionals continue to consider the implications of the 2006 U.S. Supreme Court landmark decision regarding CWA jurisdiction, Rapanos v. United States. In this Article, Matthew A. Axtell uses Justice William O. Douglas'travel description of Alaska's Last Lake as a hypothetical to test the potential impact of the 2001 SWANCC decision as well as Rapanos on the federal government's CWA authority in Alaska. He begins by analyzing the CWA regulatory regime that applied for many years to Alaskan tundra wetlands before SWANCC and Rapanos.