Editors' Summary: To promote prompt cost recovery and equitable allocation of liability for remediation costs assessed under CERCLA, Congress granted liable parties the right to sue other potentially responsible parties (PRPs) for contribution. The exercise of this right, however, has resulted in inequity and undue complexity. In trying to determine what constitutes a fair allocation of remediation costs, courts have applied allocation techniques that ignore basic economic principles.

The twentieth-century equivalent of the Holy Grail — at least in U.S. environmental law — is the status of "innocent landowner" under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act¹ (CERCLA or Superfund). Intent on preserving the fear of God, as it were, among the flock, the government argues that this exalted status is unreachable: if one finds contamination, one is no longer innocent; if one misses it, one did not look hard enough.

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA or Superfund)¹ has been construed to impose strict, joint and several, and retroactive liability on owners and operators of sites where there is a release of a hazardous substance.² The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA or the Agency) is charged with the responsibility of enforcing CERCLA to clean up the nation's toxic waste sites.

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund)¹ provides for the allocation of responsibility for and cleanup of damage to the environment caused by hazardous substances.² The policies underlying CERCLA assign responsibility for payment of cleanup costs to those who pollute. In contrast, the policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code³ attempt to provide a reorganized debtor the opportunity for a fresh start after certain claims against it have been discharged.

Institutional controls (ICs) are restrictions on the use of land. In the context of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund),¹ they are used to reduce the dangers to the public from releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances or dangerous pollutants or contaminants. ICs are used frequently as part of the overall strategy for cleaning up a release, instead of or in addition to active response measures, such as treatment or disposal.

Editors' Summary: This Article is the third in a three-part series on federal wetlands law. In it, the author concludes her comprehensive review of the current state of laws and regulations that address wetlands. In the first two installments, published in April and May, the author focused on the Clean Water Act, and specifically the § 404 program. Here, the author analyzes federal laws, other than the Clean Water Act, that address wetlands.

Does the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)¹ suspend the states' authority to enforce environmental laws at sites selected by the federal government for remedial action? The United States has taken that position to avoid compliance with state laws at federally owned hazardous waste sites. The issue recently came to a head before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in a case concerning the U.S.

A sharp conflict among the judicial circuits has emerged concerning whether private parties may recover attorneys fees in cost recovery actions under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).¹ The issue centers on the meaning of CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), which permits private parties to recover "necessary costs of response … consistent with the national contingency plan."² Specifically, the question is, does the phrase "necessary costs of response" include attorneys fees?

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act¹ (CERCLA) does not expressly provide for joint and several liability, but it is well-established that under CERCLA § 107(a)² potentially responsible parties (PRPs) will be jointly and severally liable for the release, or threat of release, of hazardous substances.³ As a general proposition, a PRP may be able to defend against the full application of joint and several liability in a particular case if it can show that harm it caused or for wh

Editors' Summary: When Congress passed CERCLA, it chose to omit specific reference to joint and several liability in the statute, intending courts to determine the scope of liability on a case-by-case basis. Since then, courts have applied common-law principles, set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, to cases involving multiple defendants responsible for contamination at CERCLA sites. These principles call for imposition of joint and several liability on multiple tortfeasors unless the harm is divisible or there is a reasonable basis for apportionment.