In October of 1980, the National Wildlife Federation and two Alaskan communities lost in their bid to obtain an injunction against the Department of the Interior's sale of oil and gas development leases in the Beaufort Sea.¹ Nevertheless, they negotiated with the Department of Justice a stipulation under which they would receive just under $60,000 in attorney fees, pursuant to the attorney fees provisions in the Endangered Species Act and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.

On February 1, 1982, a scant 11 months before the deadline by which all areas in the country except those with severe automobile-related pollution problems are to meet federal clean air standards, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) conditional state implementation plan (SIP) approval policy.¹ This ruling relieved EPA of its obligation to assume the regulatory responsibilities of those states that had not satisfied the rigorous planning requirements imposed by Congress in the 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act

Judicial enforcement of federal environmental statutes has resulted in some uncertainty over the extent of the discretion enjoyed by the courts in fashioning equitable remedies. Some courts have insisted that where they are faced with a clear violation of a statute containing a flat ban on or a mandatory precondition to an activity the court must enjoin the activity pending compliance. Others, apparently the majority, have held that while injunctions are not mandatory, there is a presumption in favor of furthering the statutory purposes.

One of the recurring questions under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)¹ is the extent to which it requires federal agencies to consider the effects of their actions on people. It is undisputed that the impacts that must be addressed within an environmental impact statement (EIS) include effects on natural resources and ecosystems. Certainly, where a proposed federal action will induce direct biological impacts in humans, they must be explored with an EIS.

The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA)¹ was enacted in 1977 to alleviate the widespread environmental impacts of surface coal mining operations.² To remedy a perceived lack of adequate state regulation, the Act imposes stringent uniform federal standards on mining operations, which will be enforced by states, if they choose to do so, and by the federal government where states decline. Central to the federal enforcement program are administrative civil penalties.

The last several years have marked a precipitous growth in federal, state, and local legislation governing the transportation of dangerous materials, e.g., bulk chemicals, compressed gases, hazardous waste, and radioactive materials. The reasons underlying this trend are fairly discernible. Hazardous waste and its associated health risks have been frequent targets of the media, to the point that few members of the public are unfamiliar with the Love Canal incident or the dangers of toxic waste dumps generally. This has engendered an enduring public clamor for governmental responses.

The Supreme Court's recent decision in Sporhase v. Nebraska,¹ although a narrow ruling as applied to Nebraska, could nonetheless significantly disrupt groundwater law in other states. In addition, while it reaffirms the leadership of states in water resources management, it makes clear that there are no constitutional obstacles to federal preemption of the increasingly vital and difficult job of groundwater management.

On August 17, 1982, a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit overturned the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) October 14, 1981, redefinition of "source" for nonattainment area programs in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch.¹ The court found a surprisingly simple solution for what has been a difficult and recurring problem of statutory interpretation, but, as a result created perhaps unintended problems for EPA's energetic, but still emerging, emissions trading program.

The 1981-82 Term of the United States Supreme Court was marked by a paucity of substantive environmental rulings as the Court repeatedly declined to review lower court decisions. The Court denied review in more than 35 environmental cases including products liability suits against asbestos manufacturers, challenges to the dredge and fill permit provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) and a variety of Clean Air Act disputes.

On April 30, 1982, United States District Court Judge John T. Curtin of the Eastern District of New York issued his decision and order approving a settlement agreement between plaintiffs and defendants in United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp.,¹—the Hooker Hyde Park Landfill case. This was one of four cases filed in December 1979 by the federal government against the company for its waste disposal practices in Niagara Falls, New York.