One of the most crucial public policy problems facing America today is the lack of progress in dealing with hazardous waste. At the root of this inaction is an overriding issue: How do we pay the immense cost of correcting the damage done by past waste handling practices?

Editors' Summary: One of the traditional principles of tort law states that a cause of action is allowed only if a present injury exists. This principle has been gradually eroded as an increasing number of courts in toxic tort cases have allowed plaintiffs to recover for the increased risk of developing a disease in the future as a result of exposure to a toxic substance.

Although the law governing the siting of municipal waste landfills varies from state to state, there are similarities in procedures and problems. This Dialogue provides some suggestions on how a landfill applicant can efficiently proceed through the siting process and uses the recent successful siting application filed by Gallatin National Company before the village of Fairview, Illinois, as an example.

Editors' Summary: The doctrine surrounding the rights of individuals to pursue legal remedies in the courts has a long and complex history, and has resulted in a patchwork of rules that are not always easy to follow. Standing to sue limitations have their origins in Article III of the United States Constitution, which limits federal jurisdiction to "cases and controversies." In the early 1970s, the Supreme Court paved the way for environmental groups to participate directly in the evaluation of environmental law by liberalizing the rules pertaining to standing.

Editors' Summary: Toxic tort cases often involve thousands of documents, procedural complexities, and difficult scientific and legal issues. The ability of our legal system to rationally resolve these cases depends on the competence of the factfinder to evaluate the volumes of technical evidence generated in these cases. The author argues that the complexities of these cases are beyond the abilities of lay juries and judges. He proposes that special juries of persons with scientific and medical training be used in complex toxic tort cases.

Under the Constitution of the United States of America, states are provided substantial rights. Indeed, the Tenth Amendment provides that "[p]owers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."¹

In the beginning, God created man and woman.

Soon thereafter, oil spill compensation and liability legislation sprang from the primordial slime. This development sent man and woman scurrying off to law school (and a few straight to Congress)—destined to argue the finer points of the bill throughout eternity.

Editors' Summary: The Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound, Alaska, did more than ravage a pristine environment. It also exposed the deficiencies in the jumble of federal and state laws that establish liability for environmental and economic damages caused by oil spills. The author, using the Exxon Valdez spill as a example, analyzes whether full compensation for all parties damaged by tanker oil spills is available under the existing statutory scheme.

Editors' Summary: One of today's hottest legal battles is the ongoing dispute between corporations and their insurance companies over who will pay for hazardous waste cleanup. When Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act in 1980, it decided that the private sector, not government, would be liable for most of the cleanup costs. But within the private sector, Congress left open to what extent the standard insurance policies would cover this liability.

Environmental watchdogs awaited with some concern the two National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)¹ decisions of the Supreme Court during its 1988-1989 term. The issues were important, and the Court had not been especially kind to NEPA in the past. The Court's decisions in the two cases, Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council² and Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council,³ came down on May 1, 1989.