Five summers ago in Rio de Janeiro, world leaders gathered at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) and committed themselves to the pursuit of sustainable development.¹ As part of that commitment, they signed an impressive array of agreements, including the Forest Principles, the Convention on Biodiversity, the Convention on Climate Change, and Agenda 21.

Editors' Summary: This Article addresses whether citizens have standing to bring citizen suits under EPCRA for wholly past violations—an issue presented before the U.S. Supreme Court last month in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment. The author argues that citizen plaintiffs can satisfy Article III standing requirements even if a defendant comes into compliance before the citizen suit is filed.

Over the past several years, legal scholars have been theorizing about the disproportionate number of environmental problems in urban and minority areas.¹ Many view the entire issue of environmental justice² or, depending on the writer, "environmental racism"³ as a matter of air, water, or soil contamination, or other industrial conditions amounting to environmental blight in and around communities made up of less advantaged, if not abjectly poor, people.

This Dialogue proposes to give permittees a new option in environmental permitting. The option will compress the permitting cycle while simultaneously generating better public support and better environmental protection. To some people, the option will seem radical. It should seem less so after reviewing the breadth and depth of the current initiatives in reinventing environmental permitting.

Since the final publication in late 1996 of the International Organization for Standardization's (ISO's) environmental management systems (EMSs) standard, ISO 14001, the cacophony of claims and counterclaims about the standard has grown louder. The commentary is wide-ranging, with some of the more noteworthy claims being that ISO 14001:

. is a "green passport" signifying environmental excellence;

. is a plot by industry to undercut more deserving international environmental initiatives;

. is a plot by consultants to make money off of industry;

Editors' Summary: This Article addresses how courts have applied the sudden and accidental and absolute pollution exclusions of insurance policies to indoor air pollution claims. The authors focus on how a majority of the courts have found that the pollution exclusions do not preclude coverage for damages that result from the release of pollutants to the indoor environment. The authors first discuss the types of claims that are associated with indoor air pollution and then go on to provide general information about the sudden and accidental and the absolute pollution exclusions.

This is a time of high tensions between the federal government and the states over environmental regulation.¹ The flashpoints include actions by the U.S.

Editors' Summary: Combatting interstate air pollution is one of the major challenges in the effort to improve air quality. For decades, federal legislation has addressed this problem, but with little success. Now, with EPA's adoption last year of new ozone and fine particulate matter standards, this issue is receiving even more attention.

Editors' Summary: Through an analysis of six case studies of specific industries, this Dialogue identifies barriers to the development of new environmental technologies. After providing background information on the environmental technology industry, the author discusses barriers to technology innovation that are specific to the environmental regulatory system. He then identifies the barriers to innovation that arise from economic and business conditions, including industry conservatism and risk aversion, inadequate funding, and a lack of research and development.

Editors' Summary: This Dialogue analyzes nature as a model for environmental law. The author first identifies three valuable characteristics of nature and examines how they are created by ecosystems. Next, the author argues that the centralized and hierarchical regulation of environmental law ignores nature's valuable characteristics and, in fact, directly opposes nature's decentralized niche-based structure. The author asserts that such a centralized structure of environmental regulation lacks innovation, is subject to institutional bias, and results in incomplete decisionmaking.