A number of regulatory innovation efforts were initiated in the mid-1990s in response to a growing consensus that the existing regulatory system, by itself, was no longer sufficient to address new demands or environmental dilemmas unforeseen 30 years ago. Chief among the new challenges are the ever-increasing universe of regulated entities expanding government agencies' workloads and the vexing problems of nonpoint and areawide sources of pollution.

Introduction

The U.S. Supreme Court's latest regulatory takings decision, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,¹ is significant for its rejection of what I term the positive notice rule.² It also confirms the narrow scope of the categorical rule, developed in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,³ for government actions that work complete takings of property.

Introduction

Introduction: The Portland Miracle

The most stringent¹ anti-sprawl measure adopted by any American state is Oregon's urban growth boundary (UGB) program.² A UGB is a line designating "areas already marked by 'urban-type' development, within which that type of development is to be channeled and encouraged, and beyond which such development is to be discouraged or forbidden."³ Thus, a UGB discourages development of new suburbs, and encourages development in older cities and suburbs.

Introduction

In the late 1990s, the Massachusetts Office of Technical Assistance for Toxics Use Reduction (OTA), a nonenforcement agency of the commonwealth of Massachusetts dedicated to the on-site provision of pollution prevention assistance, developed a sector-based program intended to demonstrate a fast path to a common-sense environmental regulatory system. The program, funded by the U.S.

This Dialogue offers three quantitative facts, drawn from long-term experience in toxic chemical control in the United States. Each one documents failure, on a large scale, of conventional federal policy to protect human health against toxic chemical hazards in the environment. Each also disproves some of the core assumptions of that policy. Individually and together, these three facts pose a deep challenge to the policymaking community, not only for toxic chemical control but for environmental regulation broadly.

The recent flurry of scholarship and debate¹ over the use of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in environmental policymaking is still largely academic. However strongly the academy feels one way or the other, the role of CBA in environmental policymaking does not appear to be changing dramatically. Even the Senate confirmation of the controversial John Graham to an important Office of Management and Budget (OMB) post² is not likely to substantially change policy, given the scrutiny his decisions will now receive. Undoing the U.S.

Introduction