Editors' Summary: Regulation of hazardous materials (HAZMAT) transportation has developed in a piecemeal fashion over the past century. In response, Congress passed the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act in 1975 and the Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform Safety Act in 1990, delegating authority to the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) to improve effectiveness, consistency, and uniformity in HAZMAT regulation. The U.S. EPA also participates in HAZMAT regulation under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.

On April 29, 1992, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a final rule¹ that attempts to define the parameters of the security interest exemption set forth in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).² Acting in the wake of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.,³ EPA proposed and promulgated the rule in response to increasing concerns of secured creditors.⁴

Editors' Summary: CERCLA § 107 is perhaps best known as creating a cause of action for the recovery of costs incurred in responding to releases of hazardous substances. Recently, however, federal and state governments have used it increasingly in suits to recover natural resource damages. This Article describes the elements of a CERCLA cause of action for the recovery of natural resource damages and compares them to the elements of a CERCLA cause of action for the recovery of response costs.

Editors' Summary: The Superfund law already acts like a dragnet to sweep corporations into the net of liability. Now more and more individual officers, directors, employees, and shareholders find themselves caught up in the liability net as well, and such corporate individuals across the country wonder about the contours of Superfund liability and how to stay out of it.

Editors' Summary: To promote prompt cost recovery and equitable allocation of liability for remediation costs assessed under CERCLA, Congress granted liable parties the right to sue other potentially responsible parties (PRPs) for contribution. The exercise of this right, however, has resulted in inequity and undue complexity. In trying to determine what constitutes a fair allocation of remediation costs, courts have applied allocation techniques that ignore basic economic principles.

The twentieth-century equivalent of the Holy Grail — at least in U.S. environmental law — is the status of "innocent landowner" under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act¹ (CERCLA or Superfund). Intent on preserving the fear of God, as it were, among the flock, the government argues that this exalted status is unreachable: if one finds contamination, one is no longer innocent; if one misses it, one did not look hard enough.

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA or Superfund)¹ has been construed to impose strict, joint and several, and retroactive liability on owners and operators of sites where there is a release of a hazardous substance.² The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA or the Agency) is charged with the responsibility of enforcing CERCLA to clean up the nation's toxic waste sites.

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund)¹ provides for the allocation of responsibility for and cleanup of damage to the environment caused by hazardous substances.² The policies underlying CERCLA assign responsibility for payment of cleanup costs to those who pollute. In contrast, the policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code³ attempt to provide a reorganized debtor the opportunity for a fresh start after certain claims against it have been discharged.

Institutional controls (ICs) are restrictions on the use of land. In the context of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund),¹ they are used to reduce the dangers to the public from releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances or dangerous pollutants or contaminants. ICs are used frequently as part of the overall strategy for cleaning up a release, instead of or in addition to active response measures, such as treatment or disposal.

Editors' Summary: This Article is the third in a three-part series on federal wetlands law. In it, the author concludes her comprehensive review of the current state of laws and regulations that address wetlands. In the first two installments, published in April and May, the author focused on the Clean Water Act, and specifically the § 404 program. Here, the author analyzes federal laws, other than the Clean Water Act, that address wetlands.