There is a startling lack of global regulation of the marine ornamental trade. The only international legal framework that governs the trade of marine ornamentals is the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). Requirements under Appendix II help prevent traded species from reaching the point where they need stricter protections, while Appendix III targets species that range countries want help controlling in international trade. Yet both of these appendices are poorly equipped to help regulate the marine aquarium trade.

The iron and steel sector contributes nearly 7% of global anthropogenic GHG emissions. As global climate commitments tighten and industrial decarbonization becomes urgent, green steel, produced using low-carbon alternatives such as green hydrogen and renewable electricity, has emerged as a potential solution. This Comment explores how national and international regulations are shaping the future of green steel, focusing on the interplay between climate policy and trade law.

For the first time in nearly 50 years, following the federal government's recission of CEQ's NEPA implementing regulations on April 11, 2025, there are no governmentwide regulations in place to provide consistent direction to all federal agencies on how to implement the governmentwide procedural obligations established by NEPA. This Comment explains the costs of eliminating the common floor that the CEQ regulations had established for federal agencies conducting the environmental analyses required to comply with NEPA’s statutory mandate, and why those costs need not have been incurred.

In Marin Audubon Society v. Federal Aviation Administration, a divided panel for the D.C. Circuit cast significant doubt on the continued durability of CEQ’s NEPA regulations, stating that the agency lacked the authority to issue binding regulations governing federal agencies’ compliance with NEPA. This Comment argues that on closer examination of the court’s legal reasoning, these sweeping statements concerning CEQ’s regulatory authority actually amount to nonbinding dicta.

Tribes in the Pacific Northwest have faced persistent obstacles to their exercise of treaty fishing rights, most prominently illegal regulation of off-reservation fishing by state governments. As salmon decline, a new frontier is emerging for treaty right violations: environmental degradation. A recent court victory ruled that a series of culverts owned and operated by the state of Washington violated tribal treaty rights to fish for salmonids at their “usual and accustomed” places.

In China, the year 2024 witnessed further evolution of environmental protection and development of legislation and rulemaking. This mainly included adoption of the Energy Law of the People’s Republic of China, revision of the Mineral Resources Law of the People’s Republic of China, and adoption of a series of administrative regulations. This Comment summarizes some of the year’s major developments.

State trust lands, covering more than 40 million acres across the West, were granted to states with the primary purpose of generating revenue for public schools and other designated beneficiaries. These lands were historically managed for extractive uses such as grazing, timber harvesting, and mineral development. This Article examines how recreation—ranging from hiking and hunting to wildlife viewing and camping—fits within this fiduciary framework.

There has been an influx of “climate superfund” bills introduced and adopted in state legislatures across the country. Modeled after the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), these laws are designed to recover costs from large emitters of greenhouse gases (GHGs) to pay for climate adaptation infrastructure.

An antitrust paradox lies at the heart of private-sector climate commitments. On the right, state attorneys general have warned that they may challenge these collaborations under antitrust laws. On the left, antitrust enforcers in the Biden Administration asserted that these actions will not receive preferential treatment even if they address societal ills that are not being addressed by governments. This Article asks what antitrust law is willing to consider: if prosocial goals are framed in terms of economic harms, should antitrust law view climate action as violating that standard?