ELR Citation: ELR 21191
No(s). 91-1749 (4th Cir. Jun 19, 1992)

The court holds that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) preempts state common-law tort claims and breach of warranty claims for crop damages caused by herbicide application only if the underlying state common law duty imposes a labeling requirement that conflicts with federal standards. The court first notes that no language in FIFRA or its legislative history indicates that Congress intended to occupy the entire field of pesticide regulation. The only language in the Act providing that FIFRA supplants state authority in registering, using, selling, or labeling pesticides is in FIFRA §136v. The court holds that FIFRA does not preempt any less broadly defined field than the field of regulating pesticides. Section 136v(b) is a statement of the limits of the federal objectives underlying FIFRA, and does not express Congress' intent to usurp all power, even in the narrow field of pesticide labeling. The court concludes that FIFRA does not prohibit the sale or use of the pesticide involved in this case. The court further holds that if state law imposes a labeling requirement that is the same as the federal standard, even if the state law provides compensation or other remedies for a violation, the state law does not conflict with the federal law, as long as Congress chooses not to explicitly preempt the state law. The court next holds that state common-law tort duties can be labeling requirements within the meaning of FIFRA §136v(b). The court observes that a jury verdict would have the same effect as a legislatively enacted state regulation. The court also holds that FIFRA does not explicitly create a federal right of action to compensate persons who may be injured by pesticides labeled in a misleading manner. The court next holds that although state common-law duties can be considered labeling requirements under FIFRA §136v(b), the plaintiffs' specific tort and contract claims are not necessarily inconsistent with FIFRA's labeling requirements or U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's implementing regulations. FIFRA §136v(b) preempts the establishment or enforcement of any common-law duty that would impose a labeling requirement inconsistent with requirements established by FIFRA or its implementing regulations. However, if a state imposes a duty to improve a product or to maintain a label in accordance with federal standards, no conflict exists, and the state law is not preempted.

Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants
Mark Ira Cantor
Cohan & Francomano
20 South Charles St., Baltimore MD 21201
(301) 332-1400

Counsel for Defendant-Appellee
Raymond Gerard Mullady Jr.
Piper & Marbury
36 South Charles St., Baltimore MD 21201
(301) 539-2530

Before Widener and Ellis, JJ.