ELR Citation: ELR 20007
No(s). 93-7837 (3d Cir. Oct 21, 1994)

The court holds that Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) §113(g)'s three-year statute of limitations for contribution claims does not preempt state nonclaim statutes, and that Delaware's nonclaim law bars a chemical company's CERCLA contribution claim against the estate of a deceased officer and director of the company's predecessor-in-interest. The company failed to assert its claim against the estate within the statutorily prescribed eight months. The court first holds that CERCLA does not explicitly preempt all state environmental law, but only those state laws for which compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility or that stand as obstacles to Congress' full purposes and objectives. The court holds that CERCLA does not preempt Delaware's nonclaim statute, because the company could have complied with both statutes by notifying the estate of its claim within the eight-month period and filing its CERCLA contribution claim within three years of the date of the judgment for response costs. Also, Delaware's nonclaim statute provides a mechanism that can be used to preserve contingent contribution claims under CERCLA. The court holds that Congress could not have intended implicitly to preempt Delaware's nonclaim statute. A state has a particularly strong interest in the prompt settlement of its citizens' estates, and nothing in CERCLA's language suggests that Congress intended to preempt state law governing claims against decedents' estates. Rather, Congress' creation of the "innocent landowner" defense to CERCLA liability demonstrates by analogy that Congress did not intend to modify state probate law. Nor did Congress intend to modify state law governing a party's capacity to be sued. Moreover, preemption would be unworkable because it would subject long-settled decedents' estates to any CERCLA claims filed within three years of the date of judgment or entry of judicially approved settlement.

Turning to the estate's counterclaim for indemnification, the court holds that CERCLA does not affect Delaware corporate law regarding indemnification. The court affirms the district court's decision that the company must indemnify the decedent's estate for expenses the estate has incurred in this action. Although the decedent may be found personally liable as an operator under CERCLA, the estate is entitled to indemnification because the company's claims arise from the decedent's activities as an officer and director of the company's predecessor-in-interest.

[The district court's opinion is published at 24 ELR 20466.]

Counsel for Appellant
Judity N. Renzulli
Duane, Morris & Heckscher
1201 Market St., Ste. 1500, Wilmington DE 19899
(302) 571-5550

Counsel for Appellee
James F. Burnett
Potter, Anderson & Corroon
350 Delaware Trust Bldg.
P.O. Box 951, Wilmington DE 19899
(302) 658-6771

Before Mansmann, Cowen, and McKee, JJ.