ELR Citation: ELR 20323
No(s). 1:92-cv-1040-ODE (N.D. Ga. Sep 30, 1994)

The court holds that environmental groups lack standing to challenge the U.S. Forest Service's 1986 land and resource management plan (LRMP) for the Cherokee National Forest in eastern Tennessee. The LRMP includes a 10-year timber sale action plan that sets out targeted harvest yields for specific geographic areas; however, it does not designate any specific areas for timber harvesting in the years following 1989. The groups challenging the LRMP claimed that it violates the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) or its regulations by designating too great a proportion of the forest as suitable for timber harvesting, setting targeted timber harvest levels that are too high, and inadequately protecting the forest's biological diversity and visual resources. The groups did not, however, attack the classification of any particular parcel of land, the clearing of any particular area, or any particular project.

The court first holds that the groups have failed to show injury-in-fact. Noting that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 22 ELR 20913 (1992), expressly invalidates the notion that standing can arise from an alleged procedural injury, the court holds that the groups' theory of procedural injury is invalid. Addressing the groups' assertion that the LRMP without more threatens them with actual or imminent injury because it sets the parameters for future decisions as to specific timber sales or the development of particular sites, the court follows Sierra Club v. Robertson, 24 ELR 21596 (1992), in which the Eighth Circuit held that environmental groups could not show injury-in-fact based on the LRMP for the Ouachita National Forest because adoption of the LRMP did not effectuate any on-the-ground changes or dictate that any particular site-specific action causing environmental injury must occur. The court notes that although the Forest Service's decision adopting the LRMP is a final agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act, final agency action does not necessarily confer standing. Moreover, although the LRMP sets parameters for future timber sales and development of the forest, it is quite general, contains projections far into the future, and is subject to piecemeal change and periodic revision. The court notes that should the groups find that a particular proposed development in the forest under the LRMP is objectionable, there would be no impediment to judicial review then. The court holds that because the groups cannot show injury-in-fact solely on an assertion that the federal defendants violated the NFMA and/or its regulations, and because the LRMP does not, without more, create actual or imminently threatened injury to the groups, they have failed to carry their burden of showing that they have standing to bring the action.

The court next holds that the groups' claims are not ripe for the same reason that they lack standing. Further, dismissal of the action will cause the groups little or no hardship, because a new administrative planning cycle for the forest is imminent, there is a possibility that new facts will be developed during the cycle, and more minds, perhaps with different outlooks, will be involved. And to the extent that the groups do suffer some hardship, it will be justified because the issues are decidedly complex and do not readily lend themselves to judicial resolution by "generalist" courts. Finally, the court dismisses as moot several motions pertinent to the merits of the action and grants the federal defendants' motion to supplement their briefing.

Counsel for Petitioner
Debra Wassenaar
Southern Environmental Law Ctr.
201 W. Main St., Ste. 14, Charlottesville VA 22902
(804) 977-4090

Counsel for Respondent
James Swift, Ass't U.S. Attorney
U.S. Attorney's Office
Richard Russell Bldg.
75 Spring St., Ste. 1800, Atlanta GA 30335
(404) 331-6954