ELR Citation: ELR 20309
No(s). CIV-79-990C (W.D.N.Y. Oct 2, 1990)

The court holds that New York State's claim for punitive damages for common law public nuisance against a chemical company is not barred by New York penal law, New York case law, the U.S. Constitution, or the New York Constitution. The court first holds that the state's punitive damages claim is not barred by the criminal nuisance provisions of New York Penal Law §240.45(1). Defendant has not shown that by enacting §240.45(1) or any of its predecessors, the New York legislature intended to preclude the state from seeking punitive damages in a civil nuisance action. The court holds that New York case law makes clear that punitive damages have been recognized as one of the remedies available to the state to redress a public nuisance. The court further holds that the state's claim need not be authorized by statute, since it is based on nonstatutory, common law causes of action. The court finds that the deterrent effect of current environmental laws does not render the award of punitive damages for a deterrent purpose unnecessary. Any deterrent effect produced by punitive damages would add to, rather than subtract from, any deterrent effect produced by environmental laws. The court holds that the New York common-law standard for assessing punitive damages is not unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution or the New York Constitution. New York law provides limits on the amount of such damages that a trier of fact can award. The court holds that the state, in proving its claim, need not satisfy the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant has not shown that state-sought punitive damages were ever considered a criminal punishment under New York law. The alleged behavior for which punitive damages are sought has been recognized as a civil wrong for hundreds of years. Punitive damages clearly are rationally connected to the public policy of protecting public health and the environment. Assuming, arguendo, the truth of the state's allegations, the damages sought are not necessarily excessive in relation to the vital public interests at stake. Finally, the court holds that whether the state's recovery of punitive damages would violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment is not ripe for adjudication. Liability has not been found, let alone an award made, for such damages.

[Previous decisions in this litigation are published at 11 ELR 20883; 12 ELR 20701; 14 ELR 20875; 15 ELR 20801; 16 ELR 20079; 18 ELR 20580; 20 ELR 20354, 21346.]

Counsel for Defendant
Thomas H. Truitt, Steven K. Yablonski
Piper & Marbury
1200 19th St. NW, Washington DC 20036
(202) 861-3900

Counsel for Plaintiff
Robert Abrams, Attorney General; Eugene Martin-Leff, Robert E. Herman, Ass't Attorneys General
Environmental Protection Bureau
120 Broadway, New York NY 10271
(212) 341-2000