United States v. Dion

ELR Citation: ELR 20676
No(s). 85-246 (U.S. Jun 11, 1986)

A unanimous Court holds that the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (Eagle Protection Act) abrogates rights granted in an 1858 treaty to the Yankton Sioux Tribe to hunt bald and golden eagles on the Yankton reservation for noncommercial purposes, and that defendant may not assert treaty hunting rights as a defense to a prosecution under the Endangered Species Act. The Court first observes that the 1858 treaty establishing the reservation gave the tribe the exclusive right to hunt and fish on their land and that the only question before the Court is whether Congress has since abrogated the treaty. The Court then rules that Congress did abrogate the treaty in the Eagle Protection Act. After noting that it has been reluctant to find an abrogation of treaty rights absent an explicit statutory statement by Congress, the Court establishes that the essential test is whether there is clear and reliable evidence of Congress' intent. In the instant case, Congress did not explicitly state in the Eagle Protection Act that it was abrogating treaty rights, but the inclusion of a provision in the Act allowing the taking of eagles by Indians for religious purposes strongly suggests that taking for other purposes is prohibited. The legislative history supports this conclusion. The 1962 amendments extended protection to the golden eagle already granted the bald eagle, but did not stop there; the changes to the statute indicate that Congress gave thoughtful deliberation to the effects Indian hunting was having on eagle populations and made a conscious decision to ban such hunting except in specific, narrowly defined circumstances.

The Court holds that the defendant is barred from asserting his treaty hunting rights as a defense to a prosecution under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). It declines to expressly rule on whether the ESA abrogates hunting rights granted in the treaty. Even if the evidence surrounding Congress' intent in the ESA is insufficient to abrogate treaty rights, defendant is still barred from asserting the defense. The Court has already held that the Eagle Protection Act abrogates the treaty rights, and Congress' failure to expressly discuss these rights in another statute does not revive them. Moreover, the two statutes prohibit the same conduct for the same reasons, and it would not be logical to allow conduct under the ESA already prohibited under the Eagle Protection Act.

The Court declines to rule on whether the Eagle Protection Act invades religious freedom if it abrogates Indian treaty hunting rights, since defendant did not assert this argument on appeal.

[The lower court opinion appears at 15 ELR 20093.]

Counsel for Petitioner
Jeffrey P. Minear, Ass't to the Solicitor General
Department of Justice
10th St. & Constitution Ave. NW, Washington DC 20530
(202) 633-2000

Counsel for Respondent
Terry L. Pechota
Finch & Viken
304 Main St., P.O. Box 2934, Rapid City SD 57709
(605) 348-6547

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