ELR Citation: ELR 21113
No(s). 90-3615 (6th Cir. Apr 30, 1991)

The court holds that the jury instructions accurately stated the law and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant a mistrial to a violator of the Clean Air Act (CAA) criminal provisions regulating release of asbestos, and Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) criminal provisions requiring notification of asbestos release. The court holds that the criminal liability provision in CAA §112(c) requires knowledge only of the emissions themselves, not knowledge of the statute or of the hazards the emissions pose. Individuals dealing with asbestos and other hazardous substances have constitutionally adequate notice that they may incur criminal liability for emissions-related actions. The court holds that instructions that the jury could establish the emitter's knowledge of the release under the CAA by finding that he closed his eyes to facts or failed to investigate facts, accurately state the law and do not offend due process. The court holds that the jury instruction to find the emitter guilty under CERCLA if he knew of the presence of asbestos, but not asbestos's legal status also accurately states the law. The court holds that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the emitter's motion for a mistrial where the jury never saw or heard the prejudicial evidence.

Counsel for Appellant
Leonard W. Yelsky
526 Superior Ave. E., Ste. 1050, Leader Bldg., Cleveland OH 44114
(216) 781-2550

Counsel for Appellee
Jay M. Cain
Office of the U.S. Attorney
1404 E. Ninth St., Ste. 500, Cleveland OH 44114
(216) 363-3910

Before: RYAN and SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judges; and ZATKOFF, District Judge.^*