ELR Citation: ELR 20281
No(s). 86-3055 (11th Cir. Dec 2, 1987)

The court holds that the Clean Air Act preempts a Florida statute that prohibits the owner of a gray market automobile from acquiring title and registration until the owner has obtained documentation that the vehicle complies with federal emission and safety standards. Gray market automobiles are imported cars that are not designed or built to comply with federal emission and safety standards. The court first holds that plaintiffs have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Florida statute. Plaintiffs' assertion that Florida has unlawfully refused to issue titles and registrations to owners of gray market vehicles constitutes an allegation of a distinct and palpable injury. Plaintiffs have also alleged the likelihood of redress if the statute is declared unconstitutional. Although Environmental Protection Agency regulations prohibit gray market vehicles from being operated on public highways prior to final federal approval, owners may have other legitimate reasons for acquiring title and registration, such as securing bank financing.

The court holds that the Clean Air Act preempts state regulation of emission controls from new motor vehicles prior to the initial sale. Although the state contends that the Florida statute simply ensures that new cars coming into the state comply with federal law, Clean Air Act §209(a) expressly prohibits states from adopting or attempting to enforce any emission standard for motor vehicles prior to initial sale. The court holds that the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act does not preempt the Florida statute, since the Florida law does not impair the enforcement of federal safety standards or frustrate Congress' intent in establishing uniform safety standards for vehicle manufacturers. The court holds that the Florida statute violates the Commerce Clause by diverting the stream of commerce in gray market vehicles from Florida to other states. The court remands to the district court the issue of whether plaintiffs should be allowed to add an appropriate party as a defendant in light of the state's untimely assertion of sovereign immunity. The court holds that plaintiffs' claim is not moot although the automobile in question has received final admission, since the issue is capable of repetition yet evading review.

A dissenting judge would hold that plaintiffs lack standing because they have not shown that they have been injured by the Florida statute. Plaintiffs' inability to title and register gray market vehicles before final admission does not constitute a cognizable injury since federal law prohibits the driving or selling of the vehicle until the vehicle is granted final admission. The dissenting judge would hold that the individual plaintiff's action is moot. The judge would also hold that the Florida statute does not violate the Commerce Clause.

Counsel for Defendant-Appellant
Eric J. Taylor, Ass't Attorney General
Department of Legal Affairs
The Capitol, Tallahassee FL 32301
(904) 487-1963

Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees
Robert P. Smith Jr.
Hopping, Boyd, Green & Sams
Suite 420, First Florida Bk. Bldg., P.O. Box 6526, Tallahassee FL 32314
(904) 222-7500

Before TJOFLAT and HATCHETT, Circuit Judges, and EATON^[*], District Judge.