ELR Citation: ELR 20716
No(s). S 83-035 LKK (E.D. Cal. Apr 18, 1985)

The court holds that the Secretary of the Interior improperly deleted split-estate lands from classification as Wilderness Study Areas (WSAs) under §603 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) and must manage permanently deleted holdings of less than 5,000 acres under an Interim Management Policy (IMP) for lands potentially classifiable as WSAs.

First considering standing, the court holds that the potential harm of development to the plaintiffs' members' aesthetic, conservation, and recreational interests in the use of the disputed lands constitutes personal injury, and that such injury is both attributable to the defendant's actions and redressable by court relief. The court also holds that the plaintiffs meet the prudential requirements for standing because they are asserting their own personal legal interests, they are challenging a specific statutory interpretation, and their claims fall within the zone of interests protected by FLPMA. The court then holds that the issues are ripe for review, since the agency action is final as to the lands' potential for wilderness status, the questions are legal, and the action is sufficiently direct and immediate to make judicial review appropriate, given the lands' potentially permanent removal from wilderness protection.

The court then considers the intervenors' argument that all owners of mineral interests on lands affected by the case should be joined or given notice and the opportunity to intervene. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2)(i) requires the joinder of all parties subject to joinder who have interests that are related to the subject matter of the action and whose interests may be impaired or impeded as a practical matter by the outcome of the case. The intervenors bear the burden of persuasion, because ordering joinder might force dismissal, and placing the burden on the movant is consistent with conventional allocation of burdens and implicitly supported by the Supreme Court. The court holds that since FLPMA §603(c) protects the uses existing at the time FLPMA was adopted, returning the lands to wilderness review status would not affect the interests of the mineral rights owners on split-estate lands. Furthermore, FLPMA §102(h), which preserves mining claims under the 1872 Mining law, protects interests in the lands less than 5,000 acres. Noting that the issue is close, the court holds that joinder is barred by the public interest exception, which overrides Rule 19's joinder requirements when the issues involved are of public concern and joinder of a large number would be required. The court also holds that due process does not require giving interest holders notice and opportunity to intervene, because the interest holders' property rights are protected by §603(c) of FLPMA whatever the outcome of the litigation. Requiring notice in cases challenging national regulations would be unduly burdensome and therefore discourage future litigation, in contrast to cases holding that notice is required where the plaintiff is identifiable, amenable to service, and directly deprived of property.

The court then begins its review of Secretary Watt's order, holding that it is freely reviewable since it is based on Congress' explicit directions regarding lands to be studied under FLPMA, making it interpretive rather than an exercise of the Secretary's delegated legislative powers. Since the decision excluding the split-estate lands reversed a previous policy and required no special expertise, it is entitled to little or no deference. FLPMA §603(a) clearly states that public lands reviewable as wilderness areas include lands in which the United States has an interest. A surface interest is sufficient. Separate ownership of the mineral rights does not preclude wilderness status. FLPMA incorporates the Wilderness Act's definition of classification scheme for wilderness, which focuses on the surface attributes of the land, and contemplates that mining may recur. Further, inclusion of land as WSAs need not unlawfully deny or extinguish property rights in the subsurface estate. The court holds it is not bound by a Ninth Circuit definition of public lands excluding lands in which the United States has only mineral interests, noting that the present case is the converse situation and that the circuit court's decision is undermined by a Supreme Court case holding that public lands include split-estates. Turning to the status of the lands less than 5,000 acres, the court holds tht while Secretary Watt's order properly recognized as unlawful Secretary Andrus' decision to formally designate the lands as WSAs pursuant to §603, the order wrongly assumed that by default the lands must now be managed for multiple use. Secretary Watt's order did not affect Secretary Andrus' lawful order under FLPMA §§202 and 302 that the lands be managed for possible wilderness designation. Since the court holds that the part of the order opening the lands for multiple use is invalid, that part is not ripe for review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) or the National Environmental Policy Act. The court holds that the part of the order finding §603 inapplicable was interpretive and does not trigger the notice-and-comment requirements of the APA.

Counsel for Plaintiffs
Johanna Wald
Natural Resources Defense Council
25 Kearney St., San Francisco CA 94108
(415) 421-6561

Robert Dreher
Sierra Club
2044 Filmore St., San Francisco CA 94108
(415) 567-2100

Craig Thompson
Deputy Attorney General
1515 K St., Suite 511, Sacramento CA 95814
(916) 445-9555

Counsel for Defendants
Gary Randall
Land and Natural Resources Division
Department of Justice, Washington DC 20530
(202) 633-5313

Counsel for Intervenors
William Mellor
Mountain States Legal Foundation
1200 Lincoln St., #600, Denver CO 80203
(303) 861-0244

Peter Leyton
White, Fine & Verville
1156 15th St. NW, Suite 1100, Washington DC 20005
(202) 659-2900

Ann Veneman
Damrell, Damrell & Nelson
1625 I St., P.O. Box 3489, Modesto CA 95353
(209) 526-3500