ELR Citation: ELR 21068
No(s). A89-095 (D. Alaska Feb 9, 1991)

The court rules that defendants are liable only to those plaintiffs that suffered direct physical impacts from the 1989 oil spill in Prince William Sound. The court first holds that the oil spill is a maritime tort subject to admiralty jurisdiction. The spill meets both the locality and maritime nexus requirements for admiralty jurisdiction. Whether particular claims fall under admiralty jurisdiction is a factual question of whether damages occurred on or off shore, and if damages were on shore, whether they were proximately caused by the grounding of the Exxon Valdez. The court notes that claims filed by sport fishermen, kayakers, and fish tenders will probably meet the test for admiralty jurisdiction. Further, claims for damages that occurred on land, such as claims asserted by shoreside businesses and fish processors, are also likely to qualify for admiralty jurisdiction under the Admiralty Extension Act because the oil spill was probably the proximate cause of the shore-based damage claims. The court holds that general maritime law, including the Robins Dry Dock rule, which provides that a plaintiff may not recover for economic losses when negligence does not result in physical harm, applies to all tort claims except those based on strict liability. The court holds that the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (TAPAA) displaces general maritime law regarding strict liability, including the Robins Dry Dock rule, to the extent of its $100 million coverage. The Alaska Act, which is state legislation imposing unlimited strict liability for oil spills, is not preempted by TAPAA for the first $100 million of damages. The court holds that the Robins Dry Dock rule applies to claims under the Alaska Act for damages over $100 million because general maritime law would apply. However, the court notes that it would be unworkable to allow strict liability claims for the initial $100 million to proceed under both acts in federal and state court. The court asks the federal government and Alaska, which have other statutory remedies, to refrain from making claims against the TAPAA Fund to maximize the recovery for private claimants who have suffered economic losses. The court certifies its decision for interlocutory appeal and urges the 9th Circuit to promptly rule on whether, and to what extent, the Robins Dry Dock rule applies to the economic claims of parties other than commercial fishermen.

Counsel for Plaintiffs
Lloyd B. Miller
Sonosky, Chambers, Sache & Miller
900 W. Fifth Ave., Ste. 700, Anchorage AK 99501
(907) 258-6377

Counsel for Defendant
Douglas Serdahely
Serdahely, Bogle & Gates
1031 W. Fourth Ave., Ste. 600, Anchorage AK 99501
(907) 276-4557