ELR Citation: ELR 21241
No(s). 89-0685L (D.R.I. Jan 13, 1993)

The court holds that purely economic injuries arising from a maritime oil spill are not cognizable under general maritime law, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), or the Rhode Island Environmental Injury Compensation Act. The court holds that an oil spill, which occurred in Narragansett Bay off the coast of Rhode Island, constitutes a maritime tort within the court's jurisdiction. Citing Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927), the court observes that judge-made maritime law bars claims for purely economic losses sounding in tort. Also, none of the claimants are entitled to the Robins rule exception for commercial fishermen. The claimants with the circumstances most akin to that of commercial fishermen are seafood dealers, but the differences between the dealers and fishermen are more compelling than the similarities. Other courts have refused to extend the fishermen's exception to other classes of plaintiffs because they do not work on the high seas and thus are not "the favorites of admiralty." Since the dealers are not entitled to the exception, the other claimants, whose similarities to fishermen are even more attenuated, also fail to qualify under the fishermen's exception. The court holds that the Robins rule is applicable regardless of the fact that the conduct leading to the spill is subject to criminal liability.

The court next holds that the Rhode Island law, which would allow claimants to recover for purely economic loss, is inapplicable in this case. The U.S. Supreme Court only allows state laws to modify or supplement maritime law where the state law is not hostile to the characteristic features of the maritime law or inconsistent with federal legislation. The Rhode Island law is in direct conflict with established maritime law on the issue of liability and must therefore yield. The court also holds that the FWPCA does not displace judge-made maritime law. The FWPCA preempts maritime nuisance claims, but not negligence claims for oil spills. The Act evidences no intent to provide recovery for private parties who were not previously allowed to collect damages. The court holds that the FWPCA does not delegate to states the authority to enact legislation that preempts federal maritime law. Taken in its entirety, FWPCA §311(o), the Oil and Hazardous Substance Liability section, indicates that while states may pass laws that do not conflict with the section, such laws also may not conflict with federal maritime law. Nothing in the history of the FWPCA suggests that Congress intended to grant states plenary power in this area.

Counsel for Plaintiff
Thomas H. Walsh Jr., John J. Finn
Bingham, Dana & Gould
150 Federal St., Boston MA 02110
(617) 951-8000

GordonP. Cleary
Vetter & White
20 Washington Pl., Providence RI 02903
(401) 421-3060

Counsel for Defendants
Ralph Kinder
Armstrong & Gibbons
155 S. Main St., Providence RI 02903
(401) 751-1500