ELR Citation: ELR 20681
No(s). 92 C 0413 (N.D. Ill. Oct 30, 1995)

The court holds that a genuine issue of material fact as to whether prior owners of a contaminated site and their paint company tenant were responsible persons under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) precludes summary judgment on their liability. The court first holds that the question whether the prior owners and tenant were responsible persons can only be resolved at trial. Based on facts that tended to show that the prior tenant deposited, spilled, leaked, or placed hazardous substances on the concrete floor of a building on the property that later were found in subsoil and groundwater on the property, a reasonable jury could conclude that the prior owners and tenant were responsible persons. The court next holds that the plain language of CERCLA supports the conclusion that a CERCLA plaintiff need not prove a connection between the CERCLA defendant's waste and plaintiff's response costs. Moreover, the final version of the law Congress passed failed to include a strict causation requirement present in an earlier House version, suggesting that Congress did not wish to impose such a requirement on any plaintiffs.

Counsel for Plaintiff
Karen K. Litscher
Much, Shelist, Freed, Denenberg & Ament
200 N. La Salle St., Ste. 2100, Chicago, IL 60601
(312) 346-3100

Counsel for Defendants
Richard R. Elledge
Gould & Ratner
222 N. La Salle St., 8th Fl., Chicago, IL 60601
(312) 236-3003