ELR Citation: ELR 20131
No(s). 08-310 (U.S. Jun 15, 2009)

The U.S Supreme Court held that a local ordinance that imposes a personal property tax on certain boats and vessels but contains exceptions that, in effect, largely limit its applicability to large oil tankers violates the U.S. Constitution's Tonnage Clause, Art. I, §10, cl. 3. The ordinance imposes "a charge for the privilege of entering, trading in, or lying in a port." The tax applies almost exclusively to oil tankers but to no other form of personal property. Moreover, the tax is closely correlated with cargo capacity. Contrary to the city's argument, the fact that the tax is designed to raise revenue for general municipal services argues for, not against, application of the Clause. The Court did not reach the question whether the tax also violated the Commerce and Due Process Clauses. Breyer, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II–A, and II–B–1, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Alito, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part II–B–2, in which Scalia, Kennedy, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Roberts, C.J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined. Alito, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, J., joined.