ELR Citation: ELR 20156
No(s). 93-2195 (4th Cir. Oct 12, 1994)

The court holds that slag produced as a byproduct of steel production is discarded material and, thus, is a solid waste under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). The court first notes that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) interpretation of RCRA's definition of "solid waste" is entitled to substantial deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 14 ELR 20507 (U.S. 1984). The court holds that EPA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the slag constitutes discarded material, because the slag is not immediately used in the production process of petitioner's steel plant. Rather, it sits untouched for six months before it is sold to other entities. EPA is justified in finding that where a byproduct sits untouched for six months, it cannot be said that it was never disposed of, abandoned, or thrown away. EPA is also justified in concluding that because the slag is sold to others for use in roadbed construction, it is not destined for beneficial reuse or recycling in a continuous process by the generating industry itself. In short, EPA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the slag is part of the waste disposal problem. The court concludes that the slag is solid waste and that therefore the steel plant that produces the slag is a solid waste management unit requiring a RCRA treatment, storage, and disposal facility permit.

Counsel for Petitioner
William T. Lavender Jr.
Nexsen, Pruet, Jacobs & Pollard
1441 Main St., 15th Fl., Columbia SC 29202
(803) 771-8900

Counsel for Respondent
Alice L. Mattice
Environment and Natural Resources Division
U.S. Department of Justice, Washington DC 20530
(202) 514-2000

Before Wilkinson and Hamilton, JJ.