ELR Citation: ELR 20552
No(s). 90-1262 (U.S. Feb 26, 1992)

The Court rules that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) correctly interpreted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) as not requiring an Arkansas publicly owned treatment works (POTW) to comply with Oklahoma's water quality standards, where the Arkansas discharges would not cause a detectable violation downstream. A Fayetteville, Arkansas, POTW received an EPA-issued permit, authorizing it to discharge effluent into a stream that ultimately reaches the Illinois River upstream from the Oklahoma border. Oklahoma and other parties challenged the permit before EPA, alleging that the downstream discharge violated Oklahoma water quality standards, which allow no degradation of water quality in the upper Illinois River. EPA's chief judicial officer remanded the permit determination, ruling that state water quality standards would be violated only if the discharge would cause an actual detectable violation of Oklahoma's water quality standards. On remand, an EPA administrative law judge concluded that Fayetteville had demonstrated that the discharge would not cause an actual detectable violation of Oklahoma's water quality standards, and the permit was issued. The circuit court reversed, ruling that the FWPCA does not allow the permit to be issued, since the Illinois River was already degraded, and the proposed Fayetteville effluent discharge would contribute to a current violation of water quality standards.

The Court first holds that interstate water pollution is controlled by federal law. Previous cases involving interstate water disputes are not dispositive of this case, because the earlier cases involved state-issued permits and this case involves a federally issued permit. The Court next holds that treating state standards in interstate controversies as federal law accords with the FWPCA's purpose of authorizing EPA to create and manage a uniform system of interstate water pollution regulation. Because the Oklahoma standards have a federal character insofar as they affect the issuance of a permit in another state, the Court holds that EPA's interpretation that the Oklahoma standards would be violated only if the Fayetteville discharge caused a detectable or measurable change in water quality was reasonable. The Court concludes that EPA's application of state water quality standards in the interstate context is wholly consistent with the FWPCA's broad purpose of restoring and maintaining the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters. That Congress, in crafting the FWPCA, protected certain sovereign interests of the states does not constrain EPA's authority to promulgate reasonable regulations requiring point sources in one state to comply with water quality standards in downstream states. The Court observes that if every discharge that had some theoretical impact on a downstream state were interpreted as degrading the downstream waters, downstream states might wield an effective veto over upstream discharges. The Court holds that the circuit court exceeded the legitimate scope of judicial review of an agency adjudication when it invalidated EPA's issuance of the permit and interpretation of Oklahoma's water quality standards. The Court holds that EPA's finding that the Fayetteville discharge would not violate the Oklahoma standards was supported by substantial evidence on eutrophication, aesthetics, dissolved oxygen, and metals. The Court observes that the circuit court should not have supplanted EPA's findings merely by identifying alternative findings that could be supported by substantial evidence. Unlike the circuit court's interpretation that the FWPCA does not allow the permit to be issued because the Illinois River is already degraded, EPA's interpretation does not concern the River's current status, but rather whether the proposed discharge will have a detectable effect on that status. Even though it might be wise to prohibit any downstream discharge, as the circuit court concluded, the Court reasons that it was not arbitrary for EPA to conclude that allowing the discharge would be even wiser, given the benefits from the flow of relatively clean water and from allowing the new plant to operate as designed.

Counsel for Petitioners
Winston Bryant, Mary B. Stallcup, Angela S. Jegley
Attorney General's Office
200 Tower Bldg., Little Rock AR 72201
(501) 682-20007

Lawrence G. Wallace, Harriet Shapiro, Michael A. McCord
Environment and Natural Resources Division
U.S. Department of Justice, Washington DC 20530
(202) 514-2000

Counsel for Respondent
Susan B. Loving, Attorney General; Robert A. Butkin, Brita H. Cantrell, Ass't Attorneys General
2300 N. Lincoln Blvd., Ste. 112, Oklahoma City OK 73105
(405) 521-3921

JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.