ELR Citation: ELR 20036
No(s). 207-5083 (Fed. Cir. Jan 12, 2010)

The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded a lower court decision holding that a circuit court mandamus order, which interpreted DOE’s obligations to a nuclear power producer under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA), was void and not entitled to any res judicata effect in a breach of contract action. In that action, the producer sought damages on account of DOE’s failure to accept nuclear waste starting on the deadline set forth in the contract between DOE and the producer. This deadline was also mandated under NWPA. DOE proposed to defend in part on the grounds that its failure to meet the deadline was excused under the “Unavoidable Delays” clause of the contract. The producer sought to bar DOE from asserting this defense as it conflicted with a circuit court order that interpreted DOE’s obligations to it under NWPA. In response, DOE asserted that, because the circuit court lacked jurisdiction in the prior matters, its order was void. Reviewing each of three grounds relied on by the lower court, the court held that the circuit court had jurisdiction in the prior matters. First, the court held that NWPA §119 places review of matters arising under NWPA §302 in a court of appeals. Even if the statute is regarded as ambiguous, any such ambiguity must be resolved in favor of court of appeals review. Second, according APA §10(c) its natural meaning, the “no adequate remedy” requirement of this provision is associated with “nonstatutory review” and does not apply to special statutory review provisions such as §119. Since §10(c) is not an impediment to court of appeals review, APA §10(a) acts to waive sovereign immunity for judicial review by the circuit court. Finally, the circuit court order was issued pursuant to its authority to construe NWPA and to direct DOE to comply with its obligations under the statute. Even though it was clear that the order would affect later litigation over contract-based rights, it remains the case that the circuit court was interpreting statutory, not contractual, rights. Accordingly, the circuit court’s action was not impliedly forbidden by the Tucker Act.