ELR Citation: ELR 20672
No(s). s. 82-354 et al (U.S. Jun 24, 1983)

The Supreme Court rules that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) acted arbitrarily and capriciously in rescinding a safety standard requiring new motor vehicles to be equipped with passive restraints. The Court first holds that the D.C. Circuit correctly decided that the proper standard of judicial review of the rescission or modification of a rule under the Motor Vehicle Safety Act (MVSA) is the Administrative Procedure Act's arbitrary and capricious standard. Since the MVSA explicitly equates revoking with establishing a rule, a revocation should not be treated as a refusal to promulgate standards, which is subject to a less rigorous review. The Court also rules that the court of appeals erred in deciding that Congress' implicit ratification of the passive restraint standard warranted an intensified judicial review of the rescission.

The Court upholds the D.C. Circuit's ruling that NHTSA's rescission of the passive restraint standard, that required installation of either airbags or automatic seatbelts, was arbitrary and capricious. The Court first rules that NHTSA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in rescinding the rule for both passive restraint options without considering the possibility of requiring airbags only. The the automobile industry opted for the seatbelt over the airbag as its preferred safety device does not justify NHTSA's disregard of the airbag option, since the MVSA was intended to force on the auto industry safety improvements that the industry had proven incapable of adopting voluntarily. Furthermore, the agency failed to explain in the record its reasons for rescinding the airbag option. The reasons petitioners presented in court for dropping the airbag option must be ignored as post hoc rationalizations. The Court also rejects petitioners' argument that the court of appeals' decision imposes extra procedures on NHTSA.

Turning to the automatic seatbelt component of the rescinded rule, the Court rules that the NHTSA action was arbitrary and capricious as well. The Court rejects petitioners' argument that the agency's substantial undertainty over the efficacy of a seatbelt rule was sufficient to justify rescission of the rule. NHTSA failed to explain rationally the evidence supporting its conclusion that the rule probably would not promote safety. The Court also rules that NHTSA was correct in considering the costs as well as the safety benefits of the rescinded rule, but that on remand it must evaluate the reasonableness of the standard's costs in light of the fact that Congress made safety the predominant concern of the MVSA. The Court next rules that NHTSA failed to articulate any basis for not requiring nondetachable belts in its passive restraint standard.

A separate opinion concurs with the majority on all issues save that of detachable automatic seatbelts. It concludes that the agency acted within its discretion in rejecting studies showing an increase in seatbelt use with such belts and that the majority went too far in contradicting the agency's analysis of this issue.

Counsel for Petitioners
Rex E. Lee, Solicitor General; Kenneth S. Geller, Edwin S. Kneedler
Department of Justice, Washington DC 20530
(202) 633-2201

J. Paul McGrath, Ass't Attorney General; Robert E. Kopp, Michael F. Hertz, C. Frederick Geilfuss
Civil Division
Department of Justice, Washington DC 20530
(202) 633-3301

Lloyd N. Cutler, John H. Pickering, William R. Perlik, Andrew B. Weissman, William R. Richardson Jr., Jonathan I. Feil
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering
1666 K St. NW, Washington DC 20006
(202) 872-6000

William H. Crabtree, General Counsel; Edward P. Good, Forest A. Hainline, Daniel P. Gimmy
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S.
300 New Center Bldg., Detroit MI 48202
(313) 872-4311

Counsel for Respondents
James F. Fitzpatrick, Michael N. Sohn, Merrick B. Garland, John M. Quinn, Boris Feldman
Arnold & Porter
1200 New Hampshire Ave. NW, Washington DC 20036
(202) 872-6700