ELR Citation: ELR 20595
No(s). s. 88-1816, -1831 (D.C. Cir. Feb 27, 1990)

The court holds that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA's) decision not to initiate rulemaking to retroactively amend the corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards for passenger cars made in model years (MYs) 1984 and 1985 was within its discretion and consistent with the Energy Policy Conservation Act (EPCA). Congress set 27.5 mpg as the CAFE standard for passenger cars made in MY 1985 and later, but delegated responsibility for setting passenger car CAFE standards for MYs 1981 through 1984 to the Department of Transportation (DOT). DOT, in turn, delegated that task to the NHTSA, which refused to initiate rulemaking, claiming the requests for rulemaking were filed after MYs 1984 and 1985 had begun. The court first holds that Congress did not clearly address whether amendments to reduce CAFE standards were to be made prior to the beginning of a model year, as is required for amendments to increase CAFE standards. While Congress' silence could mean that no deadline was contemplated, the court finds that the interpretation most consistent with EPCA's legislative history is that Congress left it to the NHTSA to decide whether to impose a deadline. Moreover, the court finds that the NHTSA did not decide against rulemaking because of an incorrect assumption that EPCA affirmatively precluded it from doing so.

The court next holds that the NHTSA's decision not to initiate rulemaking was a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies committed to its care by EPCA. The NHTSA struck an appropriate balance between the need for the auto industry to achieve steady progress toward EPCA's energy conservation goal and the practical constraints on individual manufacturers that would impede that goal. Lowering the CAFE standards after the model year had begun would undermine the limits Congress placed on the NHTSA also determined that retroactive amendments would be inconsistent with EPCA's scheme of establishing annual standards, since retroactive reductions in CAFE standards would make the credit mechanism redundant and largely irrelevant.

The court holds that the inequity to the car manufacturers that had already absorbed the costs and burdens of complying with the original standards, if retroactive reductions of CAFE standards were allowed, are legitimateconcerns providing additional support for the reasonableness of the NHTSA's decision. Further, the NHTSA's statements and position in this proceeding are consistent with its 1984 position, even though its current position is inconsistent with its prior decisions dealing with light trucks and low-volume manufacturer exemptions. Those prior decisions do not have the same potential for disrupting the statutory scheme as does retroactively amending the CAFE standards that apply to the rest of the industry.

Counsel for Petitioner
Thomas L. Arnett
General Motors Corp.
General Counsel's Office, 3031 W. Grand Blvd., Detroit MI 48202
(313) 974-1406

Counsel for Respondents
Kenneth N. Weinstein, Ass't Chief Counsel
Department of Transportation
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh St., Rm. 5219, Washington DC 20590
(202) 366-5263

Stuart M. Gerson, Ass't Attorney General
Barbara C. Biddle
Land and Natural Resources Division
U.S. Department of Justice, Washington DC 20530
(202) 633-4575

Before: WALD, Chief Judge, and RUTH B. GINSBURG, Circuit Judge, and ROBINSON, Senior Circuit Judge.