ELR Citation: ELR 21439
No(s). 90-5097 (D.C. Cir. Sep 6, 1991)

The court holds that plaintiffs lack standing in their National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) challenge to the Department of Agriculture's germplasm preservation program. Germplasm consists of plants, seeds, and plant parts maintained for study, breeding, or genetic research. Plaintiffs allege that the Department's germplasm activities are a major federal action requiring preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS). The court initially notes that it has never sustained an organization's standing in a NEPA case solely on the basis of an injury to the organization's ability to disseminate information that an EIS could be expected to contain. The court further notes that granting standing based on informational injury would potentially eliminate any standing requirement in NEPA cases. However, assuming that the Department's failure to prepare an EIS injured plaintiff organization's ability to disseminate information about the germplasm program, the court holds that plaintiff lacks standing under the Supreme Court's decision in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 20 ELR 20962. The court interprets Lujan to require plaintiffs in a NEPA case to point to some identifiable action or event that arguably triggered the agency's duty to prepare an EIS. The identifiable action or event must be a major federal action significantly affecting the human environment. The court holds that plaintiffs lack standing under the standard because the germplasm program is not an identifiable action or event, but a broad program involving a wide array of activities.

One judge dissents from the court's standing holding, but concurs in the judgment on the ground that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under NEPA. The dissent would hold that plaintiffs have adequately established standing based on an injury to their informational interests under NEPA and that the Department of Agriculture's finding of no significant impact is the agency action that caused that injury. However, the dissent would hold that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under NEPA because they have not alleged that the Department's program is the proximate cause of the environmental effects they fear.

[The complaint in this case is digested at ELR PEND. LIT. 65975.]

Counsel for Appellants
Edward Lee Rogers
1130 17th St. NW, Ste. 210, Washington DC 20036
(202) 835-1570

Counsel for Appellees
Carol Annette Petsonk, J. Carol Williams, Elizabeth Ann Peterson
Environment and Natural Resources Division
U.S. Department of Justice, Washington DC 20530
(202) 514-2000

Before: BUCKLEY, WILLIAMS, and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.