ELR Citation: ELR 20462
No(s). 85-3064 (3d Cir. Oct 21, 1985)

The court rules that the provision of the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) requiring that fee petitions be filed within 30 days of final judgment requires only that the fee petition itself be filed with the court by that time, and that pleadings detailing the amount requested may be filed subsequently. The court holds that the district court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction to consider a fee petition submitted under 28 U.S.C. §2412(d)(1)(B) that was filed within the 30-day statutory deadline and contained all allegations required under EAJA except an itemized listing of fees requested and time expended. The government has not shown that it was adversely affected by the late arrival of the fee details. Section 2412(d) contains no language indicating congressional intent that its two requirements, a time restriction on filing and standards for pleading, be construed identically. In fact, Congress' failure to impose a time limit on service of the application indicates that it was not concerned with the time in which the government received the details of the fee claim. Nor is there any need for the court to have such details at the time of filing, since the court will not act on an application until the government responds. Furthermore, construing the 30-day limit to apply to the fee pleadings would encourage attorneys to demand the highest amounts and include the most expenses and number of hours possible, since no upward amendments would be permitted after the expiration of the statutory deadline.

Although its ruling on jurisdiction is dispositive of the case, the court notes that it would also rule that a consent judgment settling a class action is a final judgment as of the date of its entry unless there is a motion for intervention prior to the expiration of EAJA's 30-day deadline for application of attorney fees. Although a judgment does not become final until the time for appeal from that judgment has passed, normally 60 days, it is questionable whether a consent judgment settling a class action is appealable. The court sees some merit in petitioners' alternative argument that dissatisfied members of the class could intervene within that 60 days to object to the judment, but finds controlling the fact that no such objection was registered within EAJA's 30-day period.

A dissent would hold that the plain language of §2412(d)(1)(B) requires fee details to be filed with the court within 30 days and would affirm the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Counsel for Appellants
J. Jerome Mansmann, Robert Cindrich
Mansmann, Cindrich & Huber
Suite 1510, Two Chatham Ctr., Pittsburgh PA 15219
(412) 642-2000

Counsel for Appellees
J. Alan Johnson, U.S. Attorney; Anthony M. Mariani, Ass't U.S. Attorney
633 USPO & Cthse., 7th Ave. & Grant St., Pittsburgh PA 15219
(412) 644-3500

Margaret A. Hill, Dirk Snel, David W. Zugschwerdt
Land and Natural Resources Division
Department of Justice, Washington DC 20530
(202) 633-1442

Before Adams and Weis, JJ.