ELR Citation: ELR 20815
No(s). 92-1402 (U.S. May 16, 1994)

The Court holds that a New York town's ordinance requiring all solid waste to be processed at a designated transfer station before leaving the town violates the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The avowed purpose of the ordinance is to retain the processing fees charged at the transfer station to amortize the facility's cost. The Court first finds that the ordinance has interstate economic effects because it drives up the costs for out-of-state interests to dispose of their solid waste, and it prevents everyone except the favored local operator from performing the initial processing step. The Court next holds that the ordinance discriminates against interstate commerce because it allows only the favored operator to process waste that is within the town's limits. The ordinance is not less discriminatory because in-state or in-town processors are also covered by the prohibition. The ordinance does not fit the narrow exception to per se invalidity, because the town had nondiscriminatory alternatives for addressing the health and environmental problems that allegedly justify the ordinance. The town could address these problems through uniform safety regulations that would ensure that competitors do not underprice the market by cutting corners on environmental safety. The town may not justify the ordinance as a way to steer solid waste away from out-of-town disposal sites that it might deem harmful to the environment, because that would extend the town's police power beyond its jurisdictional bounds. And the town cannot justify the ordinance as a financing measure necessary to ensure the long-term survival of the designated facility, because the town may subsidize the facility through general taxes or municipal bonds.

In concurring, Justice O'Connor would hold that the ordinance violates the Commerce Clause because it imposes an excessive burden on interstate commerce. Although it does not treat local interests as a group more favorably than out-of-state interests, it creates a monopoly at the expense of all competitors. The town could have promoted local interests with less impact on interstate activities. Also, Congress has not explicity authorized flow control measures as the dormant Commerce Clause requires.

In dissenting, Justice Souter—with whom Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun join—would hold that the ordinance does not violate the Commerce Clause, because it aids a local government in satisfying a traditional governmental responsibility. It does not benefit local actors or differentiate between all local and all out-of-town providers of a service. Also, no indication exists that it has harmed any out-of-state trash processor or affected the interstate movement or disposition of trash. And it imposes the facility's cost on local trash generators, not on out-of-state economic interests.

[The New York Court of Appeals' decision in this litigation is published at 23 ELR 20926. Pleadings in this litigation are digested at ELR PEND. LIT. 66297.]

Counsel for Petitioners
Paul J. Ondrasik Jr.
Steptoe & Johnson
1330 Connecticut Ave. NW, Washington DC 20036
(202) 429-3000

Kenneth Resnick, David Silverman
254 S. Main St., New City NY 10956
(914) 634-8822

Counsel for Respondent
William C. Brashares
Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glousky & Popeo
701 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Ste 900, Washington DC 20004
(202) 434-7300

Murray N. Jacobson
Town of Clarkstown, Office of the Town Attorney
10 Maple Ave., New City, NY 10956
(914) 639-2060