ELR Citation: ELR 20956
No(s). s. 94-2294, -2398 (11th Cir. Apr 17, 1995)

The court holds that Oil Pollution Act (OPA) §1013's claims presentation procedure creates a mandatory condition precedent barring all claims unless and until a claimant has presented its claims in accordance with that section. Appellants brought suit against companies responsible for an oil spill in Tampa Bay, Florida, seeking to recover business, property, and tourist damages sustained as a result of the spill, without first presenting the claims to the companies. The court first holds that the complaint constitutes a "claim" as the OPA defines that term, and that the use of the word "shall" in §1013(a) is naturally read to place a mandatory condition on all claims. No reading of §1013 suggests that Congress intended to limit its applicability to claims against the OPA-created cleanup fund. Further, the natural reading of §1013(c)'s election-of-remedies provision is that claimants filing in court against the responsible parties, as well as claimants seeking recovery from the fund, must present their claims in accordance with §1013(a). The court next holds that appellants' reliance on the OPA's overall purpose—which they claim is to expand responsible parties' liability—is misplaced. Vague notions about a statute's overall purpose should not overcome the text. Moreover, appellants present nothing from the OPA's text and little from its legislative history to convince the court that expanded liability was the only, or even the primary, goal of the OPA. Nor does the OPA's general savings clause trump §1013's more specific command. And appellants' policy objections to the claims presentation requirements should be directed to Congress, not the courts. The court next holds that the differences between the OPA, which states that "all claims . . . shall be presented" and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), which states that "[a]ll claims which may be asserted against the Fund . . . shall be presented," combined with evidence that Congress was aware of CERCLA when it enacted the OPA, suggest that Congress intended the change in the OPA's language to have substantive consequences and purposely rejected the CERCLA approach limiting the presentation requirement. The court holds that appellants' invocation of the doctrine of reading statutes in pari materia is also misplaced. The court holds that appellants have not made the extraordinary showing of contrary legislative intent necessary for the court to depart from the plain meaning of a statutory text; thus, the district court properly dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

[The district court's opinion is published at 24 ELR 21184.]

Counsel for Plaintiffs
Dominic J. Graziano
Hearne, Graziano & Nader
201 E. Kennedy Blvd., Ste. 1125, Tampa FL 33602
(813) 222-8245

Counsel for Defendants
Carl R. Nelson
Fowler, White, Gillen, Boggs, Villareae & Banker
501 E. Kennedy Blvd., P.O. Box 1438, Tampa FL 33601
(813) 228-7411

Before BLACK and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge.