A district court denied summary judgment for a company that owns and manages Iowa farmland in a lawsuit concerning a federal wetland conservation law known as Swampbuster. The company challenged the program, which disqualifies one from receiving USDA farm benefits if they convert certified wetland into crop land, on constitutional grounds. USDA moved for summary judgment, arguing the law was constitutional as a valid exercise of Congress' Spending Clause authority and that it did not constitute a "taking" because compliance was simply a condition on eligibility for voluntary programs. The court found Swampbuster is an exercise of the spending power because Congress chose to provide certain benefits to farmers conditioned upon compliance with its provisions, and that it did not unconstitutionally condition benefits upon the company giving up rights under the Takings Clause because the company "can use its land any way it wants at any time"—the only consequence is a potential loss of certain benefits. It granted summary judgment for USDA.

A district court denied summary judgment for a citizen group in a challenge to NMFS' issuance of incidental harassment authorizations (IHAs) and a letter of authorization (LOA) to wind developers off the coast of New York and New Jersey. The group argued the IHAs and LOA, which authorize take of North Atlantic right whales and humpback whales incidental to activities associated with offshore wind development projects, violated the Marine Mammal Protection (MMPA) and NEPA. The court found the claims regarding certain expired IHAs were moot, applied an exception to save from mootness the claims regarding the other expired IHAs, and concluded the group lacked standing. It further found that even if the group had standing, it failed to meet its high burden of proving NMFS' take estimates of North Atlantic right whales and humpback whales were arbitrary and capricious under the MMPA's "small numbers" and "negligible impact" requirements, but that NMFS' decision not to conduct a cumulative EIS or EA was arbitrary and capricious. It denied summary judgment for the group, and granted in part and denied in part NMFS' cross-motion.

he U.S. Supreme Court, 8-0, held that EPA's disapprovals of Oklahoma's and Utah's SIPs were locally or regionally applicable actions reviewable in a regional circuit court. The two states petitioned the Tenth Circuit to review the disapprovals, which were two of 21 SIPs EPA disapproved in 2023 for failure to comply with 2015 revisions to the ozone NAAQS. EPA moved to dismiss or to transfer the suit to the D.C. Circuit, because the omnibus rule the Agency promulgated for the disapprovals asserted they would be reviewable only in the D.C. Circuit. The Tenth Circuit granted EPA's motion to transfer, finding the rule constituted a single, nationally applicable action because EPA had grouped its disapprovals into a single rule. The Supreme Court concluded that each SIP disapproval constituted its own "action," and that they were clearly locally or regionally applicable because a SIP is a state-specific action, disapproval of which on its face applies only to the state that proposed it. It further held that EPA's disapprovals were based on "a number of intensely factual determinations" particular to each state, and thus were not based on any determination of nationwide scope or effect. It reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ., joined. Gorsuch, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Roberts, C.J., joined. Alito, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

The U.S. Supreme Court, 7-2, held that EPA's 2022 denials of six small refinery exemption petitions were locally or regionally applicable actions that fell within the "nationwide scope or effect" exception under the CAA, requiring venue in the D.C. Circuit. The small refineries challenged the denials in the Fifth Circuit. EPA moved to transfer the suit to the D.C. Circuit, arguing its actions were nationally applicable. The Fifth Circuit retained jurisdiction, finding EPA's actions were locally or regionally applicable because their "legal effect" was limited to the petitioning refineries and were not based on any determination of nationwide scope or effect because the Agency still examined refinery-specific facts before it issued the denials. The Supreme Court found EPA's denials were locally or regionally applicable actions because by definition, the Agency's denial of a single refinery's exemption petition only applies to that refinery, which is a particular entity located in a particular place. But it further held EPA's denials were based on determinations of nationwide scope or effect because the Agency itself found and published that its interpretation of the phrase "disproportionate economic hardship" and its renewable identification number passthrough theory were determinations of nationwide scope that formed the core basis for its denials, and both are conclusions that apply generically to all refineries regardless of where they are located. Finding that the Fifth Circuit erred in denying EPA's request to transfer, the Court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ., joined. Gorsuch, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C.J., joined.

The U.S. Supreme Court, 7-2, held that several fuel producers had standing in a lawsuit challenging EPA's approval of California regulations requiring automakers to manufacture more electric vehicles and fewer gasoline-powered vehicles in an effort to decrease emissions from liquid fuels. The producers sued EPA in the D.C. Circuit, arguing its approval violated the CAA because the regulations targeted global climate change rather than California air quality problems. The state intervened and argued the producers lacked standing because automobile manufacturers would not change course if EPA's approval were vacated given "surging consumer demand" for electric vehicles. The D.C. Circuit held the fuel producers lacked standing because they failed to establish that automakers would likely respond to invalidation of the regulations by producing fewer electric vehicles and more gasoline-powered ones. The Supreme Court found the regulations likely caused the producers monetary injuries and that invalidating the regulations would likely redress at least some of their injuries as it would likely result in more revenue from additional fuel sales, based on "commonsense economic principles" and record evidence. It reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Kavanaugh, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C.J., and Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Sotomayor, J., and Jackson, J., filed dissenting opinions.

The U.S. Supreme Court, 6-3, held that the state of Texas and a private business, which petitioned to review NRC's decision to grant a renewable 40-year license to a private entity seeking to store spent nuclear fuel at an off-site facility in West Texas, were not entitled to judicial review because they were not parties to the licensing proceeding. Texas and the business sued in the Fifth Circuit, arguing that federal law did not authorize storage of spent nuclear fuel at private off-site facilities. The Fifth Circuit concluded the petitioners could challenge ultra vires agency action regardless of whether they qualified as parties aggrieved under the Hobbs Act, and held that NRC lacked authority to license a private off-site facility for spent fuel storage. The Supreme Court concluded the petitioners did not qualify as parties to the licensing proceedings because they were not license applicants and they did not successfully intervene in the proceeding, and thus were not eligible for judicial review. It reversed, but did not decide the underlying dispute over whether NRC has authority to license private off-site facilities. Kavanaugh, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C.J., and Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ., joined. Gorsuch, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas and Alito, JJ., joined.