A district court granted summary judgment for several bus companies in a CAA citizen suit alleging that the companies excessively idled their buses in violation of Massachusetts and Connecticut law. The companies moved for summary judgment, asserting the group lacked standing. The court found the connections between the group members' alleged injuries and the companies' conduct were too attenuated to satisfy the traceability requirement. Concluding that the group lacked associational standing, it granted the companies' motion.

The Fifth Circuit granted oil and gas interest groups' and the state of Texas' petition to review NRC's issuance of a license to a private company to operate a temporary storage facility for spent nuclear fuel on the Permian Basin. Petitioners argued, among other things, that NRC lacked statutory authority to license the facility and violated NEPA and the APA by allowing a licensing condition that violated the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. The court found the Atomic Energy Act did not authorize the Commission to license a private, away-from-reactor storage facility for spent fuel, and that issuing the license contradicted congressional policy expressed in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. It granted the petition for review and vacated the license.

The Ninth Circuit granted in part and denied in part a petition to review FERC orders that altered which facilities qualify for benefits under the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) and how those facilities are compensated. An industry group and several environmental groups argued the orders were inconsistent with PURPA's directive that FERC "encourage" development of "qualifying facilities," a new class of independent, non-utility-owned energy producers; challenged four specific provisions of the orders; and argued FERC violated NEPA by failing to prepare an EA. The court found that PURPA on its face gives FERC broad discretion to evaluate which rules are necessary to encourage qualifying facilities and which are not, and that the Commission's interpretation was not unreasonable. It also found the provisions modifying the rules for determining when facilities are deemed to be located at the same or separate sites, modifying rates paid to qualifying facilities, allowing states to adopt a rebuttable presumption that the locational price represents the purchasing utility’s avoided costs for utilities located within certain organized energy markets, and reducing the threshold that terminates a utility's obligation to purchase from a qualifying facility if the facility has nondiscriminatory access to certain organized markets were neither arbitrary nor capricious. As to the NEPA claim, the court held FERC should have prepared an EA because the more substantive elements of the orders fell outside NEPA's categorical exclusion for rules that do not substantially change the effect of the rules being amended. It remanded without vacatur to FERC to address the NEPA deficiency.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a lawsuit alleging the Forest Service was liable as a contributor under RCRA for failing to regulate use of lead ammunition by hunters in Kaibab National Forest. Environmental groups argued that, even though the Service's activity was not the direct source of lead ammunition, it was liable as a contributor by virtue of (1) its general regulatory authority over the forest, (2) the control it exercised by issuing special use permits for outfitters and guides, and (3) its status as an owner of the forest. A district court concluded the Service was not liable under RCRA and dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. The appellate court found that the Service's choice not to regulate despite having authority to do so did not manifest the type of actual, active control contemplated by RCRA; that the Act did not impose a duty on the Service to regulate special use permits; and that mere ownership of the forest was insufficient to establish contributor liability. It affirmed dismissal for failure to state a claim.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed denial of a preliminary injunction in a challenge to the Office of Natural Resources Revenue's (ONRR's) 2016 rule changing how royalties were calculated for oil and natural gas produced on federal land. A trade group argued the rule was arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the APA. A district court declined to preliminarily enjoin the rule's oil and gas provisions and upheld it on summary judgment, finding no APA violation. On appeal, the group challenged the provisions ending allowance-cap exemptions for gross-proceeds valuation, adopting an index pricing valuation method, and adopting a default valuation method. The appellate court found ONRR examined relevant data and adequately explained why it adopted each disputed feature of the three valuation methods in the rule, and thus did not act arbitrarily or capriciously.

A district court granted summary judgment for environmental groups in a challenge to FWS' 12-month finding and determination that the eastern hellbender did not warrant listing as a threatened or endangered species under the ESA. The groups argued FWS failed to articulate a rational and legal basis for its finding, relied on unproven or uncertain future conservation measures, failed to consider the adequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms, applied an arbitrary definition of "a significant portion of its range," and arbitrarily truncated consideration of the "foreseeable future" by limiting its analysis to 25 years. The court rejected most of the claims, but found the Service's reliance on conservation measures that had not yet been implemented or determined effective rendered unlawful its determination that listing the eastern hellbender was not warranted. It vacated the determination and remanded to FWS for further proceedings.

The Fifth Circuit denied environmental groups' petition to review the Army Corps of Engineers' issuance of a CWA permit for a proposed liquefied natural gas production and export terminal on the Calcasieu River in Louisiana. The groups argued the Corps failed to adequately consider a particular alternative site and thus failed to demonstrate that the project was the least environmentally damaging practicable alternative, and that it failed to adequately justify its deviation from the CWA hierarchy of compensatory mitigation schemes. The court found that the groups did not timely alert the Corps to the alternative site and thus were not able to challenge the permit issuance on that ground, and that the Corps adequately explained its decision to depart from the default regulatory hierarchy regarding compensatory mitigation. It denied the petition.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed denial of fishing rights to the Lummi Nation in a long-running dispute over rights in certain waters in northern Washington. The Swinomish Indian Tribal Community, the Tulalip Tribes, and the Upper Skagit Indian Tribe argued that the recognized fishing rights of the Lummi Nation under a 1974 judge-issued decree did not extend to sheltered waters east of Whidbey Island and south of Fidalgo Island. A district court granted summary judgment for the three tribes, holding that the disputed waters were not part of the Lummi's historical fishing waters under the decree. The appellate court affirmed, finding no evidence that the Lummi ever held "usual and accustomed" fishing grounds in those waters. It affirmed summary judgment for the Swinomish, Tulalip, and Upper Skagit tribes.