The Fifth Circuit, 2-1, denied petitions to review EPA's 2016 designation of two counties in Texas as nonattainment for the 2010 sulfur dioxide NAAQS. The state of Texas and the owner of a power plant located in one of the counties sought to have the designation vacated, arguing it violated the CAA because evidence available at the time showed attainment, that EPA treated similarly situated counties in other states differently than the two at issue here, and that EPA misconceived the law in issuing the designation and denying petitions for reconsideration because it erroneously believed it did not have the authority to delay classification until the state gathered monitoring data. The court found EPA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in designating the two counties as nonattainment, that petitioners failed to present an argument that designation of the counties was inconsistent with the designation of other counties, and that petitioners failed to explain what aspect of the CAA the Agency misconceived when it concluded it did not have discretion to await additional monitoring data before issuing its designation. It denied the petitions.

The Fifth Circuit granted several states' petition to review DOE's 2022 rule repealing two 2020 rules concerning efficiency standards for dishwashers and washing machines. The states argued the repeal rule, which deleted the appliance categories for shorter-duration dishwashers and washing machines created by the 2020 rules, was arbitrary and capricious. The court found it unclear how or why DOE thought it had statutory authority to regulate "water use" in appliances, since the Energy Policy and Conservation Act does not seem to consider both energy use and water use of a product. But even assuming it had authority, the repeal rule failed to adequately consider appliance performance, substitution effects, and evidence that the conservation standards were causing Americans to use more energy and water rather than less; and it relied on a premise that the 2020 rules were legally invalid, which even if true did not excuse DOE from considering other remedies short of repealing the rules. It granted the petition and remanded to DOE for further proceedings.

The Eighth Circuit reversed a district court ruling in a challenge to Iowa's "ag gag" law that criminalizes undercover investigations at agricultural production facilities. Initially, the law prohibited the facilities from being accessed under false pretenses as well as prohibited false statements or misrepresentations being made as part of employment applications there. An appellate court concluded the prohibition on accessing a facility by false pretenses did not violate the free speech clause of the First Amendment, but the prohibition on making false statements in an application was insufficiently tailored and unconstitutional because it encompassed statements that were not material to an employment decision. A new law addressed the materiality problem in the employment provision and narrowed the scope of both provisions by adding an intent element. Nonprofit groups sought to enjoin enforcement, arguing the new law violated the First Amendment. The district court concluded the law was viewpoint-based because the intent requirements targeted speakers with negative views of agricultural facilities; it ruled that the provisions did not satisfy strict scrutiny, and enjoined officials from enforcing the law. The appellate court concluded the law was not a viewpoint-based restriction, but a permissible restriction on intentionally false speech undertaken to accomplish a legally cognizable harm. It reversed the district court ruling, vacated the injunction, and remanded for further proceedings.

A district court dismissed a RCRA citizen suit over a closure plan for a coal-fired power plant in Alabama. An environmental group challenged the plan, arguing it was unlawful to permanently store over 21 million tons of coal ash and toxic pollutants in the existing unlined impoundment, situated in wetlands adjacent to the Mobile River. The plant owner moved to dismiss for lack of standing and ripeness. The court found the coal ash pollution about which the group complained—ongoing leaching of coal ash from the plant into the Mobile River—existed before the plant began closure and thus was not fairly traceable to implementation of the closure plan. Further, the plan being challenged was not final and not ripe for review. The court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

A district court granted environmental groups' motion to lift a stay of a suit challenging NMFS' biological opinion (BiOp) concerning oil and gas activity in the Gulf of Mexico. The groups initially argued NMFS issued a flawed BiOp that underestimated the risks of harm to protected species and took inadequate measures to mitigate those risks. They subsequently agreed to a stay in reliance on NMFS' representations that measures to protect the Rice's whale would be in place for the duration of the stay. Oil and gas companies intervened and asked another court to enjoin two of the measures, which the court did. The groups then moved to lift the stay. The district court found that because some of the measures the groups were counting on to secure their interests during the stay were no longer in place, there was good cause to lift the stay. NMFS simultaneously moved to remand without vacatur, but the court found it was neither substantial nor legitimate, would not serve the interest in judicial economy, and would unduly prejudice the groups. It denied NMFS' motion to remand, and granted the groups' motion to lift the stay.

A district court granted the state of Louisiana's request to block EPA and DOJ from imposing disparate impact mandates under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. The state argued the agencies were attempting to create disparate impact mandates under Title VI by regulation without having authority to do so. The court found the agencies had constructed Title VI to allow regulation beyond the statute's plain text, and thus invaded the state's domain. The state also challenged EPA's cumulative impact mandates, which the court found were more than mere suggestions and carried a real threat of enforcement. The court further found the mandates imposed substantial costs on the state, and that the state was entitled to clarity concerning the agencies' power to regulate beyond the plain text of Title VI. It enjoined the agencies from imposing or enforcing any disparate impact-based requirements against the state or any state agency under Title VI and from imposing or enforcing any Title VI-based requirements unless they were ratified by the president and based on requirements found within the four corners of EPA's disparate impact regulations.