In an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part summary judgment for FWS in a challenge to the Service's issuance of an incidental take regulation for polar bears living along Alaska's Beaufort Sea. Environmental groups argued FWS failed to satisfy the Marine Mammal Protection Act's requirements that the take be of "small numbers" of bears and have a "negligible impact" on the Beaufort Sea population. The court found FWS' decision to subdivide Level A harassment into two categories when making its negligible impact determination was reasonable, but that its failure to offer an aggregate figure was not. It further found FWS erred by not examining the five-year risk of Level A take, but that it satisfied the "least practicable adverse impact" standard and that the groups' other claims concerning the take calculations were unpersuasive. It reversed summary judgment with respect to FWS' failure to determine five-year cumulative risk of Level A take in assessing "negligible impact" and failure to address the high likelihood of unauthorized Level A take, and remanded to the Service to determine whether aggregating serious and non-serous Level A take yields a “reasonably likely” result and whether the five-year risk of taking a denning cub is "reasonably likely" to occur.

The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that the Takings Clause does not distinguish between legislative and administrative land use permit conditions, in a lawsuit concerning a traffic impact fee as a condition of building a prefabricated home on a parcel of land. The landowner challenged the fee as an unlawful exaction of money under the Takings Clause, relying on prior rulings in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U. S. 825 (1987), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U. S. 374 (1994). A state appellate court rejected the argument because the fee was imposed by legislation and because Nollan and Dolan applied to permit conditions imposed on an ad hoc basis by administrators. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding nothing that supported exempting legislatures from ordinary takings rules. Because there was no basis for affording property rights less protection in the hands of legislators than administrators, the Court held that the Takings Clause applies equally to both and thus prohibits both from imposing unconstitutional conditions on land use permits. It vacated the appellate court ruling and remanded for further proceedings. Barrett, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Sotomayor, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Jackson, J., joined. Gorsuch, J., filed a concurring opinion. Kavanaugh, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Kagan and Jackson, JJ., joined.

A district court denied the state of Alaska's and North Slope Borough's challenge to NMFS' decision not to delist the Arctic ringed seal as an endangered species following their 2019 petition. The plaintiffs argued NMFS failed to credit new information from FWS' analysis, failed to credit the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change fifth assessment report's (AR5's) new information, and failed to credit new biological information. The court found NMFS' 90-day finding provided a reasonable explanation concerning FWS' decision, the AR5 modeling, and the updated population data. It denied plaintiffs' challenge and upheld the 90-day finding.

A district court denied tribes' and conservation groups' request to preliminarily enjoin construction of a transmission line through the San Pedro Valley in Arizona. The plaintiffs argued BLM violated the National Historic Preservation Act when it authorized construction to begin without assessing the impacts on traditional cultural properties (TCPs) or consulting with the tribes. The court found plaintiffs' claims concerning impacts on TCPs were time-barred, and that the tribes were afforded various consultation opportunities. It denied the motion for preliminary injunction.

A district court denied summary judgment for conservation groups in a challenge to BLM's authorization of six lease sales for oil and gas development in the western United States. The groups argued BLM failed to take the requisite "hard look" when analyzing the cumulative impact of greenhouse gas emissions, wrongly adopted a piecemeal approach by reviewing the six sales in isolation rather than in unison, erred in issuing a FONSI and refusing to prepare an EIS, and violated its duty under FLPMA to avoid “unnecessary or undue degradation” of the affected lands. The court found BLM reasonably exhausted available tools to analyze environmental consequences, and that there was no reason to conclude the sales would cause "unnecessary and undue degradation" under FLPMA. It denied summary judgment for the groups and granted BLM's cross-motion.

A district court denied the state of Florida's motion for a limited stay of the court's prior ruling vacating EPA's approval of Florida's application to assume permitting authority under §404 of the CWA. Environmental groups initially sued, arguing EPA and FWS violated the ESA because neither the programmatic biological opinion (BiOp) nor the programmatic incidental take statement (ITS) included species-specific analysis, effects analysis, quantification of take, and related statutory and regulatory requirements. The court had found the BiOp and ITS failed to satisfy ESA requirements, and vacated EPA's approval. Florida subsequently argued a limited stay of the vacatur was needed to avoid undue disruption, confusion, and delay in §404 permitting in the state. The court found a limited stay was "neither workable nor desirable," because it would require various federal agencies to work with the state to continue processing §404 applications that do not implicate the ESA, while requiring the Corps to process those that do implicate the ESA. It denied the motion.

A district court granted in part and denied in part summary judgment for conservation groups in a challenge to BLM's authorization of a lease sale for oil and gas development in Wyoming. The groups argued BLM failed to take a "hard look" at the potential environmental impacts of the Wyoming sale, as required by NEPA, and that it violated the APA by treating the Wyoming lease sale differently from five other sales and by failing to justify a sale of this magnitude in light of the mounting climate crisis and its own estimates of the steep social costs from projected greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The court agreed with the groups that BLM erred when assessing the Wyoming sale’s impact on groundwater and wildlife and explaining how its analysis of GHG emissions influenced its leasing decisions, but was not persuaded by the groups' other challenges. It granted in part and denied in part summary judgment for the groups.

A district court granted in part and denied in part summary judgment for environmental groups in a challenge to an Idaho law authorizing expanded authorization of recreational wolf trapping and snaring in the state's grizzly bear habitat. The groups argued Idaho's continued authorization and expansion of trapping and snaring was reasonably certain to cause unlawful “take” of grizzly bears in violation of ESA §9, and sought to enjoin it until Idaho obtains an incidental take permit from FWS. The court found the groups demonstrated a reasonably certain threat of imminent harm in connection with Idaho's decision to allow and expand recreational trapping and snaring of wolves in areas where grizzly bears are present and during times they are out of their dens, in violation of the ESA. It permanently enjoined Idaho from authorizing recreational gray wolf trapping and snaring on public or private land in grizzly bear habitat except when it is reasonably certain that almost all grizzly bears will be in dens—December 1 to February 28— unless an incidental take statement is obtained from FWS.

A district court granted summary judgment for the state of Texas in a challenge to the Federal Highway Administration's (FHwA's) 2023 rule requiring states to measure, report, and set declining targets for the amount of carbon dioxide emitted by vehicles using the interstate and national highway systems. Texas argued FHwA lacked authority under 23 U.S.C. §150(c)(3) to enact the rule. The court found the plain language of §150(c)(3) made clear that performance of interstate and national highway systems focused on the effectiveness of facilitating travel, commerce, and national defense, not environmental outputs of vehicles using those systems, and thus that FHwA was not authorized to enact the 2023 rule. It granted summary judgment for Texas and vacated the rule.

A district court denied outdoor recreation groups' request to halt implementation of BLM's 2023 travel management plan (TMP) closing over 300 miles of routes previously available for off-highway vehicle use on public lands within the Labyrinth/Gemini Bridges Travel Management Area in Utah. The groups sought to preliminarily enjoin BLM from enforcing the new TMP, arguing BLM violated the Appointments Clause by acting through an employee, that the route closures violated the John R. Dingell, Jr. Conservation, Management, and Recreation Act by impermissibly creating a buffer zone around a wilderness area, that BLM acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to respond to relevant and significant public comments and by offering explanations that were counter to evidence, and that BLM violated NEPA by failing to take a "hard look" at how the choices before it affected the environment and failing to conduct an EIS. The court found the groups failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of any claims and denied the motion for preliminary injunction.